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Standards Setting and Antitrust
t
David J. Teece t and Edward F. Sherryt

In recent years, several high-profile cases have raised
questions about the appropriate relationship between antitrust
policy and enforcement and the standards-setting process. This
Article uses the tools of economic analysis to address several
aspects of this debate.
In Part I, we identify certain different types of standards,
differentiate between standards and regulations, and offer a
recent example of intellectual property issues arising in the
standards-setting process. In Part II, we identify several ways
in which intellectual property and antitrust regulations
interact during the standards-setting process.
Part III
analyzes the interplay between antitrust and intellectual
property, focusing on the various roles that firms play in
standards-setting organizations (SSOs). In Part IV, we discuss
SSO policies regarding intellectual property, including search,
disclosure, and licensing rules. Finally, in Part V we argue
that, to capture the social and economic benefits made
available through standards, antitrust authorities must
regulate sparingly, with no presumption that a "one size fits
all" antitrust policy is appropriate. In our view, a better
approach is for SSOs to establish clearly articulated rules or
policies governing both members' obligations and the SSO's
own actions.

t Copyright © 2003 by David Teece, Mitsubishi Bank Professor in the
Haas School of Business and Director of the Institute of Management,
Innovation and Organization at the University of California, Berkeley.
tt Copyright © 2003 by Edward Sherry, Senior Managing Economist at
LECG, LLC in Emeryville, CA, and a member of the California Bar.
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I. TYPES OF STANDARDS AND
REGULATIONS DIFFERENTIATED
A. DIFFERENT TYPES OF STANDARDS
Standards have become an increasingly significant aspect
of many industries. But the term "standard" has a number of
different meanings or uses, with fundamentally different
implications for antitrust policy. In their recent treatise on IP
and Antitrust, Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley
"define a standard rather broadly as any set of technical
specifications which either does, or is intended to, provide a
common design for a product or process."1 They note that
"standards" are not restricted to today's high-tech fields, but
2
include such mundane matters as electrical plugs and outlets.
Other common examples of standardized products include nuts
and bolts (Society of Automotive Engineering versus metric)
and electrical voltage (110 volts versus 220 volts).
The Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley definition can be
misleading in some contexts. Many standards (including many
interoperability standards) do not specify a "design for a
product" so much as they identify certain features of the
product that are standardized, leaving many if not most other
product features unspecified and unstandardized.
For
example, the design of a toaster includes the design of the plug
at the end of the power cord. While the plug design needs to be
standardized so that the cord fits into the electrical socket, and
the toaster needs to be designed to run on common household
current, the remainder of the design of the toaster per se does
not need to be, and typically is not, standardized.
Similarly, in the semiconductor industry, one common
standardization issue for new chips involves the physical chip
size and shape (the "form factor") and pin assignment
configuration 3 of the new chip. 4 Once these (and other)
1. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 35.1a
(2002 & Supp. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Chips (such as DRAMs or microprocessors) have numerous "pins"
(small metal wires) that plug into receptacles in chip sockets. Different
functions are assigned to different pins. Common functions include power,
electrical ground, and various inputs and outputs. For chips from different
manufacturers to be compatible with one another (and with the equipment in
which they are installed), they must share the same pin assignment.
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standards are set, different firms can compete among
themselves to design different versions of the chip, all of which
share the standardized features but which can differ
significantly in cost and performance.
Another common
example involves automobile tires. Tire sizes are standardized
so that tires from different manufacturers can be used
interchangeably on (suitably sized) wheel rims.
In such cases, the standard serves to promote what is often
termed "compatibility" or "interoperability."5 Products that
comport with the standard share common features so that they
are compatible with other complementary products (e.g., tires
must be compatible with wheels).
In particular,
interoperability standards govern how products interact with
other products, not how they perform their functions. Many
different designs can have the same interoperability features.
In many such cases, manufacturers compete vigorously
within the standard along a number of dimensions such as nonstandardized features, quality, and price. 6 It is all too easy to
slip into the habit of assuming that, because certain product
features have been standardized, the product itself has been
standardized.
Adoption of a standard limits "standards wars" (in which
different firms compete by offering mutually incompatible
products, such as VHS and Beta VCRs), but frequently
promotes competition within a given standard. 7 To take a wellknown example, the IBM personal computer (PC) versus
Macintosh "standards war" involved competition between
Apple's Macintosh standard (which Apple kept proprietary, so
that "Mac clones" were generally not available) and the "open"
PC standard, which fostered competition between IBM and
numerous brand-name (e.g., Compaq) and no-name "PC clone"
8
manufacturers.
Other standards do not involve "design" issues. One well4. See, e.g., JEDEC SOLID STATE TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, DOUBLE
DATA RATE (DDR) SDRAM SPECIFICATION 3-7, http://www.jedec.org/download/
search/JESD79R2.pdf (May 2002).
5. See, e.g., PETER GRINDLEY, STANDARDS, STRATEGY, AND POLICY:
CASES AND STORIES 22-23 (1995).

6. For example, there are certain technical standards for VHS VCRs to
ensure their compatibility. See GRINDLEY, supra note 5, at 75-98. But
manufacturers compete with one another by offering VCRs with a wide range
of features at a wide range of prices. See id. at 86.
7. See id. at 75-98.

8. Id. at 131-55.
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known example is product gradation standards for nonmanufactured goods. Familiar examples include United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) size categories (Large,
Extra Large, Jumbo) and quality categories (Grades AA, A, B)
for eggs, USDA grade categories for beef (Select, Prime,
Choice), and grading standards for gemstones such as
diamonds (color and clarity).
Of course, other product
gradation standards (such as gradation standards for plywood,
tire tread wear, or gasoline octane ratings) do involve
manufactured products and, thus, affect certain aspects of
product design. 9 The principal purpose of such product
gradation standards is to provide customers with a way of
comparing product features (such as size and quality) across
different sellers.' 0 As long as such gradation standards are
provided for information purposes only, such gradation
standards would not appear to raise competition policy
concerns.'1
In his 1982 book, now-Justice Stephen Breyer drew
another key distinction between performance standards(which
specify that goods must achieve certain performance
characteristics, but which allow firms to achieve those
performance levels in whatever fashion they can) and design
standards (which specify particular features which goods must
have if they are to conform with the standard). 12 Performance
standards do not have the Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley
"common design" feature.
Nevertheless, their definition captures the most common
situation involving standardization disputes.
And such
"compatibility" (or "interoperability") standards represent
perhaps the most important economic examples of
standardization. Significant economic benefits accrue if the
products of different manufacturers are compatible, even if
they are not identical. Such compatibility or interoperability
promotes consumers' ability to substitute among the products
of different suppliers, avoiding customer "lock-in" to a

9.

STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM

97 (1982).

10. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the purpose behind tire standards is to
help consumers make rational decisions).
11. One possible exception is when participants in the SSOs manipulate
the outcome so that the SSO refuses to draw a distinction that is important to
consumers. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 1, § 35.5.
12. BREYER, supra note 9, at 105-06.

2003]

STANDARDS SETTING AND ANTITRUST

1917

particular supplier. 13 For example, standardizing the physical
configuration and input-output workings of computer chips
allows computer makers to design their motherboards to
accommodate chips from different suppliers. Standardization
also helps create markets by enabling firms to achieve scale
economies in production. For example, by standardizing on a
relatively small number of different tire sizes, auto
manufacturers facilitate the development of competition among
tire manufacturers, competition that would be lessened (or
absent entirely) if each car was custom designed to work only
with a particular tire (and vice versa).
1. Formal Standards Versus De Facto Standards
Technical specifications for standards are typically
formally adopted by an SSO. 14 Some SSOs are long-lived
formal bodies and may have delegated authority. For example,
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a quasigovernmental, non-profit, "umbrella" organization comprising
hundreds of different special-purpose SSOs. ANSI is the
official United States representative to both the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). 15 Such organizations
often have numerous committees (or subcommittees) that adopt
standards in particular fields. 16 Other SSOs are less
structured, often ad hoc consortia of interested parties formed
for a particular purpose. There are hundreds of such ad hoc
consortia SSOs, especially in high-tech industries. 17
13.

For an extended discussion of "lock-in" and its competitive and
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION
RULES: A STRATEGIc GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 103-34 (1999).
14. See GRINDLEY, supra note 5, at 61-70.
15. Am. Nat'l Standards Inst., Annual Report, 6, 17, http://public.ansi.org/
ansionline/Documents/News%20and%2OPublications/Brochures/ar_2001.pdf
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
16. Id. at 9-10. For example, JEDEC (formerly the Joint Electron Device
Engineering Council) is "the semiconductor engineering standardization body
of the Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA), a trade association that represents
all areas of the electronics industry," JEDEC, About JEDEC,
http://www.jedec.org/Home/about-jedec.cfm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). It has
eleven committees and thirty-eight subcommittees (including "letter
subcommittees").
JEDEC, Roster of Committees, http://www.jedec.org/
servicemembers/Rosters/committeeroster.cfm (June 2001).
17. A recent survey by Professor Mark Lemley identified forty-three SSOs
and consortia in the "telecommunications and computer-networking
industries" alone.
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and

economic significance, see
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In addition, many "standards" are not set by SSOs at all.
Rather, they reflect the market success of a particular product
in competition with other competing products. Such "de facto"
or "market" standards are common in what economists term
"network industries" in which consumers benefit by adopting
products or processes adopted by others. 18
Well-known
examples include VHS VCRs (which "won" a "market
standards" war with Sony's Betamax VCRs) and Microsoft's
DOS and Windows operating systems. 19
2. Standards Versus Regulations
Another important distinction is between private
standards and government regulations. While many
regulations are often described as "standards" (such as "clean
air standards" or "health and safety standards"), in practice
regulations often serve to limit the range of goods or services
that can be sold, in ways that privately adopted standards do
not. The principal antitrust concern with regulatory standards
is that interested parties may be able to co-opt the regulatory
process to protect their market position against potential
competitors. For example, many local building codes routinely
adopt (as regulations) standards promulgated by otherwiseprivate SSOs such as the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA).20 The rationale for such delegation is that the SSO
has specialized expertise in the area (especially with respect to
safety issues involving changing technology) that local
government bodies are likely to lack.
But by manipulating the actions of those SSOs, private
parties can achieve an effect that would otherwise require
lobbying thousands of different city councils. The best known
example is Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,
where manufacturers of metal electrical conduit "stuffed the
ballot box" (by recruiting new members to the NFPA) in order
StandardsSetting Organizations,90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1903, 1973-80 (2002).

He acknowledged that his list is "by no means comprehensive, even within the
telecommunications and computer-networking industries" and that he
"consolidated multiple working SSOs operating under the aegis of the same
SSO and subject to the same policy." Id. at 1903 & n.45.
18.

For a discussion of network industries, see SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra

note 13, at 173-225.
19. See GRINDLEY, supra note 5, at 75, 97, 151-52.
20. See National Fire Protection Association, About NFPA, at
http://www.nfpa.org/catalog/home/AboutNFPA/index.asp (last visited Mar. 10,
2003).
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to prevent the SSO from authorizing the use of competing
21
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) conduit for electrical wiring.
Similarly, product gradation standards have sometimes
been used, in conjunction with government regulations, to limit
competition, often by prohibiting the sale of (purportedly)
"unsafe" products (e.g., PVC electrical conduit) or of products
below a certain size or "quality" level. The latter is especially
common in agricultural commodities. For example, certain
agricultural marketing programs, relics of the New Deal, allow
a marketing board to prevent the sale of "low quality"
products. 22 Similarly, professional licensing requirements are
often supported on the grounds that they prevent "unqualified"
individuals from practicing the profession, albeit at the (often
23
unstated) cost of restricting entry and raising prices.
Just as "market" or de facto standards raise issues that do
not arise in the context of formally adopted standards,
regulations (or regulatory standards) also raise a host of new
issues. For example, government agencies (unlike private
entities) enjoy governmental immunity from suit.24 Conversely,
government agencies (unlike many private entities) are
constrained by the requirements of due process generally and
the strictures of administrative law, and often cannot adopt the
sorts of streamlined procedures that private SSOs are able to
adopt.
Perhaps the most significant difference between
regulations and standards involves the coercive power of
regulations.
Most privately-set standards are voluntary;
individuals and firms can, if they choose, elect not to adhere to
the standard. 25 Unlike private standards, many regulations
21. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 49597 (1988).
22. See Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Fruit and
Vegetable Programs, http://www.fred.ifas.ufl.edu/courses/AEB6383/Lectures
2001/mktorders.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
23. For a discussion, see J.A.H. Maks and N.J. Philipsen, An Economic
Analysis of the Regulation of Professions, EUROREGIONAL J. OF SC. 17-19, at
http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/Eurecom/professionalregul.pdf (last visited Mar.
10, 2003).
24. For a discussion of the state-action and petitioning immunity issues
associated with regulatory agencies, see 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITURST LAW IT 200-231 (2d. ed. 2000).
25. This clearly does not mean that doing so is without cost. To the
contrary, the benefits associated with being compatible with the standard, and
the costs associated with being "the odd man out," are often so great that firms
frequently have little practical choice but to comply with the standard. But
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are not "voluntary."
Since compliance with government
regulations is frequently not voluntary (unlike many privatelyset standards), individuals and firms often have little choice
but to try to influence whether a regulation will be adopted, the
content of that regulation, or both. As such, individuals and
firms have immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
from antitrust liability for "petitioning" conduct designed to
26
influence what regulations are adopted.

B. A CASE STUDY: REFORMULATED GASOLINE
A recent well-known and controversial example of how a
regulatory "standard" raises intellectual property issues
involves reformulated gasoline. 27 It is widely recognized that
air pollution is a significant social and environmental problem,
and a major source of air pollution is automotive exhaust. In
the early 1990s, the California Air Resources Board (CARB), a
government entity, was under a legislative mandate to adopt
28
regulations to reduce the level of pollution.
While initial efforts to address the problem focused on
changing the car (e.g., mandating the use of catalytic
converters and requiring cars to pass periodic "smog checks"), it
became apparent that progress could also be made by changing
the source of the constraint is economic, not regulatory.
26. E. R.R. President's Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 135-40
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
27. In March 2003, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed an
administrative complaint against Unocal Corporation, alleging that Unocal
had violated section 5 of the FTC Act in connection with Unocal's patents on
reformulated gasoline. Compl., In re Union Oil Co. of Cal. (Fed. Trade
Comm'n Mar. 4, 2003) (No. 9305) [hereinafter FTC Unocal Compl.],
http://www.ftc.gov /os/2003/03/unocalcmp.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
The following factual discussion is drawn from a number of sources,
including the FTC Complaint. For background information and an extensive
discussion of various issues, including links to various briefs filed in the cases,
see Unocal's patent website, http://www.unocal.com/rfgpatentlindex.htm (last
updated Mar. 4, 2003). See also the various reported opinions, including:
Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. CV-95-2379-KMW, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22847 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1998); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Union Oil Co. of Cal.
v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001),
and sources cited therein.
Further factual discussion (and additional
citations) is found in Janice M. Mueller, Patenting Industry Standards, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 897 (2001), and Scott H. Segal, Fuel For Thought: Clean
Gasoline and Dirty Patents, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 49 (2001). (We should note
that, based on our first-hand familiarity with the matter, we disagree with
many of the factual contentions and conclusions reached by those authors.)
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018(a) (West 1996).
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the nature of the gasoline that cars burned.29 CARB was
considering adopting strict regulations requiring that gasoline
sold in California meet certain technical 30criteria governing
gasoline composition and/or characteristics.
A research group (Auto/Oil) comprised of representatives of
the gasoline industry (refiners) and the automobile industry,
conducted research on how to change gasoline formulations to
reduce pollution. 3 1 One participant in Auto/Oil was Unocal
Corporation, at the time a major gasoline refiner and marketer
in California. 32 Unocal scientists believed that the Auto/Oil
research was too limited in scope (and, in the Unocal scientists'
direction) and proposed a more
opinions, aimed in the wrong
33
extensive research project.
In particular, Unocal believed that CARB's proposed "strict
limits" approach to permissible gasoline reformulations was
unduly restrictive and that it would be possible to adopt a more
flexible approach involving what became known as a
"predictive model" (whereby one would measure certain
gasoline characteristics and predict the level of pollution that
those
with
gasoline
from
burning
result
would
characteristics). 34 In Justice Breyer's terminology (discussed
above), CARB was proposing a design standard, requiring that
gasoline meet certain fixed limits on various characteristics,
while Unocal was advocating a (limited) performance standard,
whereby refiners would be allowed to make and sell other
gasoline formulations that did not meet the fixed limits so long
as the predictive model suggested that the other formulations
would generate no more pollution than the fixed-limit gasoline
formulations.
35
Auto/Oil rejected the Unocal proposed research agenda.
29.

Both the federal Environmental Protection Agency and CARB

ultimately adopted regulations for reformulated gasoline.
note 27, at 51-54.

See Segal, supra

30.

Id. at 55-56.

31.

See id. at 55; Unocal, Auto/Oil Study Provisions, at http://www.

unocal.com/rfgpatent/rfgao.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
32. Unocal subsequently sold its refining and marketing operations to
Tosco. See Press Release, Unocal, Tosco Sign Agreement for Sale of Unocal's

West Coast Downstream Assets, http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/96htm/
121696a.htm (Dec. 16, 1996).
33. Unocal, RFG EmissionsResearch, at http://www.unocal.com/rfgpatent/
rfgresch.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
34. See FTC Unocal Compl., supra note 27, 91 37, 44, 47.
35. Unocal, RFG Emissions Research, at http://www.unocal.com/rfgpatent/
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The terms of the Auto/Oil research collaboration agreement
made it clear that, while group-sponsored research would be
made freely available to all participants, participants were free
to conduct their own proprietary research and to patent the
results. 36 Unocal funded a significant research effort, which
demonstrated both (1) that air pollution could be reduced
significantly by reformulating gasoline in previously
unexplored ways and (2) that it was possible to generate a
37
predictive model.
Unocal scientists filed for a patent on their invention, and
then disclosed the results of their research (but not the fact
that they had applied for a patent) both to Auto/Oil and
CARB. 38 Some four months later, CARB adopted regulations
(to go into effect several years later) requiring California
gasoline refiners to make and sell reformulated gasoline. 39 In
response to the regulations, California refiners had to spend
billions of dollars to upgrade their refineries to make it possible
40
to produce adequate quantities of reformulated gasoline.
Notably, the Unocal research was apparently instrumental
in persuading CARB to use a flexible--"predictive model"approach. 4 1 The key economic benefit of such a "predictive
model" approach was that it would give refiners more flexibility
to produce acceptable gasoline, thus significantly reducing the
cost of complying with the new regulations.
In February 1994, between the date that the CARB
regulations were adopted (in November 1991) and the date that
the regulations went into effect (in March 1996), Unocal's first
patent issued.4 2 The claims of the patent were such that many
(though not all) of the gasoline formulations that satisfied the
rfgresch.htm (last updated June 15, 2001).
36. Unocal, Auto/Oil Study Provisions, at

http://www.unocal.com/

rfgpatent/rfgao.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
37. See Unocal, RFG Emissions Research, at http://www.unocal.coml
rfgpatent/rfgresch.htm (last updated June 15, 2001); FTC Unocal Compl.,
supra note 27, %37.
38. FTC Unocal Compl., supra note 27, 91 32, 61-62, 66.
39. Id.
44;
Unocal,
Timeline of RFG Patent Issues, at

http://www.unocal.com/rfgpatent/rfgtime.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
40. Western States Petroleum Association, California Petroleum Industry
Overview, at http://www.wspa.org/factcpio.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003);
FTC Unocal Compl., supra note 27, 93.
41. See FTC Unocal Compl., supra note 27, 1 37, 39-40, 43, 45.
42. Five such patents have now been issued. Unocal, Unocal's RFG
Patents,at http://www.unocal.comrfgpatent/patents.htm (last visited Mar. 10,

2003).
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CARB regulations were also covered by the patent. 43 Unocal
announced that it would license other refiners to use its
patent. 44 Before the licensing terms were announced, a group
of California refiners sued Unocal, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Unocal patent was invalid. 45 After a jury
trial, Unocal's patent was upheld, and Unocal was awarded
46
significant damages for patent infringement.
One commentator cites Unocal's conduct as an example of
"patenting industry standards. '47 This claim ignores the fact
that what was at issue in the Unocal example was not an
"industry" or SSO setting a "standard," but a government body
adopting a regulation that imposed billions of dollars of costs on
the regulated California refiners (including Unocal). Unocal's
disclosure of its research apparently played a significant role in
CARB's adoption of a "predictive model" that reduced refiners'
costs of complying with the regulations by millions of dollars
per year.48 Moreover, the regulations at issue did not implicate
the
sorts
of "compatibility"
(or
"interoperability")
standardization issues that are at the core of many standards.
As such, the CARB/Unocal situation raises a wide range of
issues not present in the context of private SSOs. In particular,
the CARB/Unocal situation raised constitutional takings

43. The jury concluded that only 29% of the reformulated gasoline made
and sold by California refiners infringed the Unocal patent. Unocal, Data on
Patent Infringement, at http://www.unocal.com/rfgpatent/rfgdata.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003).
44. Unocal, Timeline of RFG Patent Issues, at http://www.unocal.com/
rfgpatentlrfgtime.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
45. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001). The refiners also claimed that the
invention arose out of the Auto/Oil research, thus challenging Unocal's claim
that its scientists were responsible for the patented invention. Id. at 995-96.
The refiners also claimed that Unocal had failed to adequately disclose the
patented invention, thus not complying with the patent law's "written
disclosure" and "enablement" requirements. Id. at 996-1001. The trial court
and court of appeals both rejected the refiners' arguments. Id. at 991.
46. Unocal, Testing the Patent in Court, at http://www.unocal.com/
rfgpatent/rfgsuit.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). David Teece testified as
Unocal's damages expert at that trial. The discussion in this paper is based
solely on publicly available information (including the public transcript of that
trial) and does not reflect any confidential or proprietary information learned
during the course of that engagement. The views expressed in this paper are
those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect Unocal's position.
47. See Mueller, supra note 27, at 897-901.
48. See FTC Unocal Compl., supra note 27, TT 37, 39-40, 43, 45.
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concerns, 49 Noerr-Pennington immunity issues, 50 and issues of
administrative law regarding the obligations (if any) of
participants in a regulatory process to disclose confidential
proprietary information (i.e., the fact that Unocal had pending
patent applications 5 1) to the regulatory agency. Moreover, the
CARB regulations were not coextensive with the scope of the
Unocal patent. Indeed, the jury concluded that only some 29%
of the reformulated gasoline made and sold by California
refiners infringed the Unocal patent.5 2 As such, firms could and
with the regulations without thereby infringing the
did comply
53
patent.
Finally, as noted above, the first Unocal patent issued (and
Unocal's plans to license the patent were announced) before the
CARB
CARB regulations were slated to go into effect.
continues to maintain its regulations even after a jury ordered
the other California refiners to pay Unocal substantial
damages for patent infringement. 54 If CARB believes that
Unocal improperly "captured" the CARB regulations, it has
49.

Professor Mueller proposes,

When government mandates a technological standard, particularly a

standard pertaining to public health and safety, any entity holding
patent rights in the subject matter of the standard should be required
to license all users at reasonable commercial terms. If the patent
owner fails to meet this requirement, the government should consider
the exercise of eminent domain over the patent.
Mueller, supra note 27, at 945 (emphasis added).
50. E. R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127,
138 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
51. At the time, pending patent applications were confidential. Congress
has since amended the patent statute to publish most (though not all) patent
applications eighteen months after filing. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2001).

52. Unocal, Patent Infringement Data, at http://www.unocal.com/
rfgpatent/rfgdata.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2003). The percentage varied
significantly by refiner. Because the patent claims were different for higheroctane gasoline than for lower-octane gasoline, the infringement percentage
was also significantly higher for premium gasoline than for regular gasoline.
See Unocal, Infringement Data from the Trial, at http://www.unocal.coml
rfgpatent/rfgsuit.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
53. A subsequently adopted industry-wide reduction in the octane level of
premium gasoline in California is likely to reduce the infringement percentage
significantly from the 29% figure on a going-forward basis, making the claim
that the patent "captured" the standard even less credible. See Lowered
Octane Fuels Debate, at http://www.geocities.com/njvorc/loweroctan.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003). Similarly, a number of refiners have contended that
they are able to "blend around" the Unocal patents and thus do not need to
take a license.
54. See Unocal, Testing the Patent in Court, at http://www.unocal.com/
rfgpatent/rfgsuit.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2003).
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clearly had the opportunity to address the issue by rescinding
its regulations. The fact that it has not done so casts doubt on
any suggestion that CARB would have adopted different
regulations had it known ex ante that Unocal had applied for a
patent.55
These issues, though significant, are not implicated in most
standards-setting contexts and are thus tangential to our main
concerns. Therefore, this Article will focus on formal standards
set by private (non-governmental) SSOs, with particular focus
on compatibility/interoperability standards.
One point is worth noting, however. There is no dispute
that Unocal disclosed its research results to CARB and
Auto/Oil. 56 But research results do not grow on trees. The
revelation of the results ipso facto implied that research was
done to discover those results. Such research is costly. Forprofit firms such as Unocal presumably conduct research,
despite the cost, because they believe that they will benefit by
doing so. One common way to benefit from research is to seek
(and hopefully receive) a patent on the results of that research.
By granting the Unocal patents, the Patent and Trademark

55. One possible caveat here is that, in response to the adoption of the
CARB regulations, California refiners spent over four billion dollars upgrading
their refineries to make reformulated gasoline. See Western States Petroleum
Ass'n, California Petroleum Industry Overview, at http://www.wspa.org/
factcpio.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). Since those costs have already been
incurred and cannot be recovered (i.e., they are what economists term "sunk"
costs), CARB may have reasoned that there was no point in rescinding the
regulations once the investment had already been made.
This argument ignores the fact that CARB anticipated that the adoption
of the CARB regulations would add twelve to seventeen cents per gallon to the
cost of gasoline, while the actual price increase following the implementation
of the regulations was only five to eight cents. CARB, Final Statement of
Reasons to Rulemaking, Including Summary of Comments and Agency
Response, 85 (Nov. 1991) (document on file with authors). In other words,
CARB was willing to adopt the regulations in the belief that the benefits to the
public as a whole (in terms of reduced air pollution) exceeded the costs to
automobile users (in the form of higher prices), even when it anticipated that
the costs would be significantly higher than they in fact turned out to be.
As such, it is unlikely that the relatively small amount of royalties
collected (of 5.75 cents per gallon on the infringing 29% of gasoline production,
which amounts to 1.67 cents per gallon on all gallons) would have been the
"straw that broke the camel's back" in CARB's decision to adopt the
regulations.
See Unocal, Testing the Patent in Court, at http:
//www.unocal.com/rfgpatent/rfgsuit.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2003).
56. See Segal, supra note 27, at 58-59; Unocal, Unocal Patent Issues
Timeline, at http://www.unocal.com/rfgpatent/rfgtime.htm (last visited Mar.
24, 2003).
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Office (PTO) agreed that the Unocal's scientists' invention was
worthy of being patented. And in upholding Unocal's patent
against a variety of challenges to validity and inequitable
conduct, the trial court judge ruled (in effect) that Unocal had
57
acted properly in obtaining its patent.
The Auto/Oil rules explicitly allowed members (including
Unocal) to conduct their own independent research and to
patent the results.5 8 The other Auto/Oil members presumably
knew or should have known that the Unocal research results
were the result of a Unocal-funded research effort-indeed, the
research program that Auto/Oil had been offered but had
previously rejected. No one should have been surprised that
Unocal, having invested in the research and having discovered
a better way to make reformulated gasoline, applied for a
patent on that invention.
Absent some explicit CARB rule or regulation requiring
disclosure of pending patent applications-and there was no
such rule; indeed, CARB did not ask Unocal (nor, apparently,
any other firm) whether it had relevant patents or patent
applications-Unocal's "failure" to disclose its patent
application (especially given that pending applications were
confidential under then-current PTO rules) should not have
deluded anyone into believing that Unocal would not seek to
patent its invention. 59 Others may have believed or assumed
that no patent would ever issue, but that mistaken belief was
not due to any conduct by Unocal.

57. See Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1210 (C.D.
Cal. 1998); Union Oil Co. v. At. Richfield Co., No. CV-93-2379-KMW, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22847, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1998); Segal, supra note 27,
at 66-67.
58. See Unocal, Independent Research Provision of the Auto/Oil Study,
availableat http://www.unocal.com/rfgpatentlrfgsuit.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2003).
59. In its Complaint, the FTC (correctly) notes that Unocal agreed with
CARB to make its research data and equations public and non-proprietary.
See FTC Unocal Compl., supra note 27,
39-42. The FTC alleges that this
meant that Unocal "created the materially false and misleading impression
that Unocal had relinquished or would not enforce any proprietary interests in
its emissions researchresults." Id. %78.b (emphasis added).
The Unocal patents cover various low-emissions formulations of gasoline.
Gasoline formulations are not data (or equations). The FTC's Complaint
effectively transforms Unocal's statement that its data was not proprietary
into a statement that patent claims derived from the research program that
yielded that data were non-proprietary.
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II. ANTITRUST ISSUES IN STANDARDS SETTING
There are two main classes of antitrust issues in the
context of standards setting: procedural issues, which address
the method by which the standard was set, and substantive
issues, which go to the content of the standard adopted.
Procedural issues include both the prospect that the SSO
will exclude interested parties who are'thus denied a stake in
setting a standard that affects them, and concerns about
standards-setting process, including
manipulation of the 60
"stuffing the ballot box." One common class of issues involves
SSO procedural rules that give some participants undue
influence over the outcome of the standards-setting process, or61
that bias the outcomes of the process in particular ways.
Substantive issues tend to arise less frequently, if only because
the antitrust authorities rarely have the expertise to evaluate
whether the "appropriate" standard was chosen.
A. STANDARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND MARKETS
One area that has received much attention of late has been
the interplay between standards and intellectual property
rights that "read on" the standard. 62 Before addressing this
issue in detail, it is worth drawing some important background
distinctions.
Perhaps the most common context in which standards are
set involves the development of new products (or aspects of
products, such as interfaces between different products) for
which standardization is seen to be desirable. Often, the SSO
contains representatives from both those who will make the
product and those who will use the product. For example,
when setting a pin-assignment standard for a new generation
of computer chips, the SSO will often involve representatives of
both chipmakers and computer (or motherboard) makers. 63 In
other words, both the supply side and the demand side of the
potential market for the standardized product will typically be
From an economic perspective, this is not
represented.
60.

See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 35.3-35.4, at 35-18 to 35-33.

61.

See id., § 35.5a, at 35-34 to 35-37.

62. See id., supra note 1, § 35.1b, at 35-6 to 35-7. See also the articles
cited in Lemley, supra note 17, at n.11.

63. The JEDEC website indicates, "Presently there are about 300 member
companies in JEDEC including both manufacturers and users of
semiconductor components and others allied to the field." See JEDEC, at
http://www.jedec.org/Home/aboutjedec.cfm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
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surprising, because the standard the SSO adopts will often
affect both suppliers and customers. Both sides of the market
strive to ensure that the chosen standard reflects their
concerns.
But when considering the relationships between standards
and intellectual property, there are two fundamentally
different "markets" at issue. The first is the product market:
the market for the products (e.g., the computer chips whose
features are being standardized) themselves. The second is the
technology market: the market for the technology (whether
patented or unpatented) used to design and manufacture the
product. In the technology market, patent holders license their
technology to manufacturing firms, which then use that
licensed technology (and other inputs) to make and sell the
standardized products. 64
Economists call demand for
technology a "derived demand," derived from the demand for
the products. 65 As noted above, many SSOs include both
suppliers (manufacturers) and customers in the product
market. 66 And the fact that the manufacturers may need to use
intellectual property belonging to others in order to make and
sell the standardized product means that the demand side of
the technology market is represented in the standard-setting
process. But there is often little or no assurance that the
supply side of the technology market-the owners of the
relevant intellectual property-will be adequately represented
in the standard-setting process.
In some contexts-especially in some high-tech industries
such as semiconductors-many, but not all, patent holders are
also manufacturers.
Such firms "wear three hats," often
participating in the relevant markets in three fundamentally
different roles. First, as patent holders, they may out-license
their patented technology to others, and, as such, they are
sellers in the technology market. Second, as manufacturers
they manufacture and sell the standardized products (i.e., they
are sellers in the product market). Third, they may also in-

64. For a discussion of the distinction between product markets and
technology markets, see, for example, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM'N, ANTITRUST
PROPERTY 8 (1995).

65.

GUIDELINES FOR THE

LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL

For a discussion of the concept of derived demand, see the survey

article, J.K. Whitaker, Derived Demand, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY

OF ECONOMICS 813-14 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter PALGRAVE].
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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license other firms' patented technology (i.e., they are buyers in
67
the technology market).
Moreover, there are some firms in many industries that do
not fit this three-role model. For example, some manufacturing
firms have no significant patented technology of their own. As
such, they are not sellers in the technology market. If (as is
common in the semiconductor industry) they need to use
patented technology belonging to others in order to make and
sell products in the product market, they will be buyers in the
technology market, needing to obtain the necessary in-licenses.
Firms without patented technology of their own to "swap"
(barter) with other patent-holding manufacturers (in the form
of out-licenses), often pay royalties that are significantly
greater than the net "balancing payment" royalties paid by
other firms that do have valuable patents. 68 Finally, some
firms are what might be termed "pure play" technology
companies and do not participate in the product market. They
out-license their patented technology for cash to manufacturing
firms. Because they are not manufacturers, they do not need
in-licenses for other firms' patents.

B. STANDARDS SETTING AND DIVERGENT ROLES
Many of the tensions involved in standard-setting, and
many of the most complicated public policy issues, can best be
understood by recognizing two key implications of the
multiplicity of roles.
First, because different firms play
different roles in the technology and product markets, the
interests of different participants in the standard-setting
67. It is rare that such firms also play a fourth role, as a buyer in the
product market, for the simple reason that firms are rarely both buyers and
sellers of the same commodity. Some buyers in the product market (e.g.,
computer manufacturers who buy chips), however, may also own relevant
patents and, thus, may be sellers in the technology market.
In some standards-setting contexts, the SSO is trying to develop
standards for the next-generation of products. As such, the products at issue
do not yet exist and thus are not yet part of the product market. But some of
the technology to make and sell the next-generation products presumably
already exists. What is being standardized are certain aspects of that
technology (e.g., certain design features of the next-generation of computer
chips). What is at issue in connection with the standards-intellectual property
issue is manufacturers' access to the technology that they will need to make
the next generation of products.
68. See Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual
Capital:Licensing and Cross-Licensingin Semiconductors and Electronics, 39
CAL. MANAGEMENT REV. 8, 9, 18-19, 33 (1997).
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process are frequently not aligned. Second, because some firms
play multiple roles (e.g., a firm can be a seller in the technology
market and a buyer in the product market), there are often
internal conflicts within the firm when the firm's different roles
conflict with one another.
Further, because of the technical nature of many
standards, SSO participants tend to be technical people, often
engineers, who rarely are familiar with their firms' patent
portfolios. 69 Moreover, in our experience, engineers tend to
have a negative attitude toward intellectual property (IP)
rights generally, seeing IP claims as "getting in the way" of
choosing the "best technological solution." To some extent, this
may be a consequence of three key facts. First, the patent
prosecution process takes time. Professors Allison and Lemley
estimate that the mean time lag between the application and
the issuance of patents issued between 1996-98 was 2.77 years,
and the median was 2.22 years.70 Second, inventors often
disclose their inventions to the public (whether by publishing
papers or by marketing products incorporating the innovation)
after filing their patent applications but while the applications
are still pending. Consequently, others know of the invention
before the patent issues; they know of the technology but not of
the patent claims associated with that technology. Third, many
patented innovations are independently discovered by others.
The patent system grants the patent to the first to invent, 7 1 but
another inventor may have already independently discovered
the technology before the patent issues.
The confluence of these three factors, coupled with the
engineering mentality of many SSO participants, suggests that
SSOs often downplay the technological contributions that
presumably led to the issuance of the patent in the first place.
By the time the patent issues, the patented technology is often
seen as "old hat" or is already widely known in the industry,
and the patent's grant of exclusivity is thus seen as merely
taking away others' ability to do what they already know how

69. The authors have obtained this information from conversations with
senior management at several major semiconductor manufacturers. See also
Lemley, supra note 17, at 1907 ("Acompany's representative to such an SSO is

normally an engineer with little or no understanding of patent law.").
70. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 98 (2002).
71. See ROBERT MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 37-38 (2d ed. 1997).

2003]

STANDARDS SETTING AND ANTITRUST

1931

to do.72 This attitude is exacerbated by two commonly held
beliefs: (1) patents are frequently issued for trivial inventions
and (2) the scope of the issued patent is often much broader
than the contribution of the inventor.
One major public policy issue thus involves balancing the
interests of intellectual property owners and the users of that
intellectual property. Almost by definition, the latter are likely
to outnumber the former; a patent has only one owner, but
multiple manufacturers may need to use the patented
technology. Hence, SSOs tend to be dominated by the demand
side of the technology market, and they are likely to adopt
procedural and substantive rules that favor IP users over IP
owners. Moreover, some SSOs, especially in the Internet field,
have a policy of flatly refusing to adopt a standard that
implicates any proprietary technology, insisting on "open"
73
standards.
C. PATENTED STANDARDS AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY

Indeed, economics suggests that SSOs have a strong
tendency to act in a socially inefficient fashion when
determining whether to adopt a standard on which a firm has a
patent. Royalty payments for the use of a patented technology
are a transfer payment from the users of the patent to the
74
owner of the patent. Thus, the royalty payments per se
72. This suggests that the commonly held view that patent infringement
inherently involves improperly and knowingly "copying" others' innovations is
incorrect. In our experience, a.significant amount of patent infringement is
"inadvertent" in the sense that the infringer did not learn of the patented
technology directly from the patent holder, but developed the technology
independently.
73. The best-known example is the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
Though W3C recently contemplated changing its policies to allow the use of
patented technology in its standards, it decided to retain its earlier policy of
refusing to adopt any standard that implicated patented technology. See
Margaret Kane, W3C Bows to Royalty Free Pressure, CNET News.com,
available at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-965863.html (Nov. 22, 2002).
74. The fact that the patent holder is charging for the use of its patent,
rather than letting others use the patents for free, leads to some degree of
what economists term "dead weight loss," in the sense that there are some
consumers who would buy the patented product (and obtain some degree of
consumer surplus) if no royalty was charged, but who will elect not to
purchase (and thus will forego the consumer surplus) when a royalty is
charged. For a discussion of the concept of dead-weight loss and its economic
significance, see HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYsIS 229-30 (3d ed.
1992).
This is not unique to the standards-setting situation, however. Some
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represent no net cost to society: the users have less money, but
the patent owner has more. But from a private standpoint,
SSO members treat the prospect of paying royalties as a private
cost akin to any other cost. This in turn implies that SSO
members have an incentive to adopt societally-inefficient
production techniques that avoid patented technology.
As an illustration, consider the following numerical
example. 75 Suppose that an SSO is trying to set a standard for
the widget-making process.
Suppose that there are two
alternative ways of making (otherwise identical) widgets, one
patented and one unpatented. 76 Suppose that the patented way
degree of "dead weight loss" is an unavoidable consequence of the fact that
society has chosen to encourage innovation by granting successful inventors
the right to exclude others from using their patented innovations, or to charge
a fee for such use.
75. This issue is treated in more analytic detail in the Appendix. See
infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
76. In his commentary on our Article, Professor Mark Patterson correctly
points out that our focus is on the choice between a patented standard (call it
P) and an unpatented standard (U), and that we do not consider a third
situation, namely, one in which no standard is adopted at all (N). Mark R.
Patterson, Antitrust and the Costs of Standard-Setting: A Commentary on
Teece & Sherry, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1995, 1997 (2003). He notes that the actions
of the SSO in adopting a standard generates value. Id. at 1999. We agree.
His focus is on the relative contributions of the SSO and the patent holder
when moving from no standard (N) to the patented standard (P). Id. at 2011.
We agree that such a focus is a worthwhile topic for investigation, but it is not
the one we focus on. Our analysis focuses on the choice between P and U.
We agree with Professor Patterson that both the SSO and its members
need to be compensated for their efforts in developing the standard. Id. at
2000-01. We acknowledge that non-members may be able to "free ride" on the
standardization efforts of the SSO and its members. But we are not convinced
that such free riding is a significant practical concern, especially in cases when
the majority of interested industry participants are members of the relevant
SSO. We note that SSOs collect dues from their members, and that SSOs can
and do copyright their standards and charge non-members for copies, which
reduces (though may not fully eliminate) the "free rider" problem. (See ANSI's
prices for copies of its standards at ANSI Electronic Standards Store, at
http://webstore.ansi.org/ansidocstore/default.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2003).)
We also believe that SSO manufacturer members benefit from the standard by
making and selling the standardized product, and that SSO purchaser
members benefit from the standard by being able to purchase compatible parts
at a lower cost than would be the case if no standard were adopted.
We further believe that the costs of standardization efforts, while clearly
non-trivial, are often very small relative to the benefits that SSO member
firms receive from standardization. For example, the semiconductor industry
is a $155 billion a year industry. See DRAM Market Drives Semiconductor
Revenue Growth, at http://www.computeruser.com/news/02/12/17/news4.html
(Dec. 17, 2002). Even if standardization efforts in the industry cost are, say,
$750 million per year (which we believe is unrealistically high), that would
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consumes $100 in real resources to make a widget, while the
unpatented way consumes $130 in real resources. Suppose
that in either case widgets can be sold for $150 and that the
patent holder demands a royalty of $35 per widget for the use
of its patent. If the SSO chooses the unpatented technology as
the standard, consumers pay $150 for widgets, firms incur $130
in real resource costs to make the widgets (and thus make a
$20 profit), and the patent holder receives nothing. Conversely,
if the SSO chooses the patented technology, consumers again
pay $150 for their widgets, firms incur $100 in real resource
costs and pay $35 in royalties to the patent holder (thus
making a $15 profit), and the patent holder receives $35 in
royalties.
From a societal standpoint, society is clearly better off if
the SSO adopts the patented technology as a standard. Society
saves $30 per widget in real resource cost savings. The $35
royalty payment from manufacturers to the patent holder is a
"wash" from a societal standpoint; manufacturers are $35
worse off, but the patent holder is $35 better off. But the SSO
members clearly prefer to adopt the unpatented technology as a
standard, because they make a $20 profit per widget rather
than the $15 profit per widget that they would make if they
adopted the patented technology as a standard.

only amount to less than 0.5% of annual industry revenues.
Moreover, we are aware of examples where the SSO itself developed
patented technology in the course of developing its standard, and applied for
patents in the name of the SSO. One example is the SynchLink consortium
(later known as SLDRAM), which developed an alternative specification for
DRAMs. SLDRAM contracted with Mosaid Technologies to develop the
technology for SLDRAM chips, and Mosaid assigned its intellectual property
rights to the SLDRAM consortium. See Press Release, Mosaid to Design Next
Generation Memory Technology, available at http://www.mosaid.com/
corporate/press97-04-18.htm (April 18, 1997). Unlike Professor Patterson, we
see no need for a sui generis form of intellectual property protection for
standards per se.
We disagree with certain aspects of his analysis, and (in particular) with
his proposal that the patent holder receives an unwarranted "windfall" when
its patented technology is incorporated in the standard, relative to what it
would receive under the no-standard (N) case. Patterson, supra, at 2009. In
our view, there are gains to both the users of the (patented) standard and the
owner of the patented technology from moving from N to P; we see no reason
why all of those gains should be attributed to the SSO's actions and should
accrue to the users of the standard rather than to the patent holder.
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D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis suggests that SSOs are likely to be
biased toward a societally inefficient attitude towards IP when
setting standards, for three reasons: (1) the rules of the SSOs
are likely to favor the users of IP rather than the owners of IP,
as the former outnumber the latter; (2) SSO participants tend
to be engineers, with an engineer's bias against patents; and (3)
royalties are treated as a private cost by manufacturers and
end-users, despite the fact that from a societal standpoint they
77
are best seen as a transferpayment rather than a (social) cost.
This in turn suggests that both the antitrust authorities
and the legislature should tread warily when making public
policy in this area. The complaints of those who believe that
they are being compelled to "overpay" for the use of others' IP
embedded in the standard are frequently and forcefully
stated. 78 The more reasoned and quieter countervailing
arguments focused on the social benefits of innovation and the
need to compensate inventors for their efforts often are downed
out by this din. The tension between static and dynamic views
of efficiency is nothing new in the context of IP. But it suggests
that policies that further burden IP and IP holders will only
exacerbate the problem.
III. CHOOSING STANDARDS

A.

THE CHOICE OF STANDARDS: DIVERGENT ROLES AND
DIVERGENT BELIEFS

In choosing a standard, there is typically a range of
alternative candidates that could be adopted as the standard.
Setting a standard may mean choosing one alternative and
discarding alternatives, but it need not do so. For example,
many health and safety standards are "inclusive" in the sense
that quite different products (e.g., wood, aluminum, and
fiberglass ladders) can all satisfy the standard. In other
contexts, the adoption of one standard effectively amounts to

77. The major caveat here is that firms may expend real resources in
what economists term a "rent-seeking" effort to affect the pattern of transfer
payments. For a discussion of the economics of rent-seeking, see Gordon
Tullock, Rent Seeking, in PALGRAVE, supra note 65, at 147-49.
78. Examples include the other gasoline refiners in the Unocal case (see
discussion, supra Part I.B), and semiconductor manufacturers in the Rambus
case (see discussion, infra Part IV.D.1).
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discarding other alternatives that could have been adopted.
For example, assigning a particular function to a particular pin
in a new computer chip means that chips that assign that
function to a different pin will be incompatible with the
standard.
In some contexts, the participants in the standard-setting
process will have very similar views as to which standard
should be chosen, and the task at hand is simply to facilitate
the coordination process by agreeing on a standard. In other
cases, however, the participants may have genuine
disagreements as to which alternative should be adopted as the
standard. In many such cases, the disagreements may arise
out of the different beliefs, expertise, or roles that the
participants bring to the table.
For example,
in designing
the next-generation
microprocessors, certain functions must be performed for the
system as a whole to work, but some of those functions can be
implemented either in hardware or in software. 79 The SSO
must determine what functions (or portions thereof) will be
implemented in hardware and what functions will be
implemented in software, in order to coordinate the
development efforts. Not surprisingly, different parties may
possess different degrees of expertise in the two areas.
Software firms may believe that it is better to have certain
functions implemented
in software, while hardware
manufacturers may believe the opposite (or vice versa). SSOs
routinely address these sorts of disagreements in the give-andtake process of setting the standard.
From an economic perspective, it is worth noting that the
positions that firms take, even on "technical" issues, are likely
to reflect the competitive positions and comparative advantages
that different firms enjoy. A firm with experience in solving a
problem in a particular way will, not surprisingly, favor
standards that adopt that familiar approach, as that will give
that firm a comparative advantage over other firms that have
more experience in alternative solutions.

79. For example, the choice of the instruction set for microprocessors (e.g.,
between Complex Instruction Set Computer (CISC) and Reduced Instruction
Set Computer (RISC) architectures) in turn affects the nature of the software
that runs on such computers. For a (moderately technical) discussion which
emphasizes

the

hardware/software

trade-off,

see

RISC

v.

CISC,

http://cse.stanford.edu/class/sophomore-college/projects-OO/riscdrisccisc/
visited Mar. 10, 2003).

at

(last

1936

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1913

Some comparative advantage may rest in a firm's
accumulated knowledge and expertise, some of which may have
arisen from research and development that may also have led
to patented inventions. Thus, firms may have a preference for
adopting a standard on which they have a patent, not primarily
because of the existence of the patent per se, but because the
firm has a comparative advantage (relative to other firms) in
the technological approach reflected in the patented technology.
It may be a difficult task to determine whether a firm supports
selecting choice A rather than choice B as the standard because
of its belief that technology A is superior, because of its
comparative advantage in using A rather than B, because of its
economic legal (patent) position with respect to A versus B, or
because of some combination of the above.
B. THE CHOICE OF STANDARDS: Ex ANTE VERSUS Ex POST
ASSESSMENT

Choosing a standard generally means that some
alternative will be adopted and other alternatives discarded.
Ex ante, prior to the adoption of the standard, there typically
will be a range of feasible alternatives available.
The
alternative selected as the standard may be significantly
superior to the alternatives, and if so, it is likely that the SSO
would have been reluctant to adopt a different standard.
But in other contexts, there exists a range of roughly
equivalent alternatives, and in such cases the need is to pick
one and standardize on it so as to facilitate coordination and
avoid fragmentation. In such situations, the chosen alternative
may be only slightly superior ex ante to other feasible
alternatives, and the SSO could have just as easily chosen
another alternative.
One clear historical example involves which side of the
road countries require automobile users to drive on. In most
countries, cars drive on the right-hand side of the road. In the
United Kingdom and certain other countries (notably Japan
and some former Commonwealth countries), cars drive on the
left.80 There is little reason to prefer one over the other, and
the other alternative could equally well have been chosen.
Clearly, it is a factual question as to the extent that the
80. See Which Side of the Road Do They Drive On?, at http://www.travellibrary.com/general/driving/drive-which_side.html#changing
(last updated
Aug., 2002).
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chosen standard was superior to available alternatives on an ex
ante basis. This issue has to be evaluated on a standard-bystandard basis.8'
However, ex post, after the adoption of the standard, once
firms have committed to the standard and have made the
requisite investment in complementary assets to manufacture
and sell the standardized product, switching to an alternative
may be much less feasible, for three reasons. First, the
industry may have made investments in implementing the
(patented) standard. Products may have been designed to meet
the standard, and factories geared up to produce the patented
standardized products. While from an economic standpoint
those costs are often "sunk costs" 8 2 (not recoverable),
manufacturers clearly do not want to incur the additional costs
associated with switching to another alternative.
Second, the need or desire for compatibility (especially
backwards compatibility with the existing installed product
base) may make it costly to switch to a different standard.
Third, and similarly, there is often a significant coordination
problem in getting all interested parties to switch to an
alternative.
For example, computer manufacturers may
already have designed their motherboards and computers to
work with existing standardized chips, and switching to a
different chip design would require changes, not only to the
chips themselves, but also to the motherboards and computers.
The difficulties associated with coordinating the necessary
changes may make it impracticable to switch away from the
patented standard.
Here again, the left-hand-versus-right-hand-drive example
provides an illustration. Once a country has adopted one
alternative, it is important for everyone to comport with the
standard so as to avoid collisions. The public and private
sectors make substantial investments in automobile design and
in road construction that are consistent with the chosen
alternative and inconsistent with the other. Changing over is
complex, requiring significant social planning and coordination,
81. From an economic standpoint, what is important is not the
technological feasibility of various alternatives, nor cost considerations
(narrowly considered), but rather the overall attractiveness (on a quality/costadjusted basis) of the various alternatives.
82. For a discussion of the nature and economic significance of "sunk
costs," see F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE 414-16 (2d ed. 1980).
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as evinced by the Swedish changeover in 1967. 83
C. STANDARDIZATION, LOCK-IN, AND OPPORTUNISM

The asymmetry between the low ex ante cost of choosing
an alternative proposed standard and the higher ex post cost of
abandoning an existing standard in favor of a new standard
causes concerns about the prospect for "lock-in." 84 In recent
years this issue has received particular attention when, after
the standard has been adopted and becomes established,
someone claims an intellectual property right (whether patent
85
or copyright) over the existing standard.
The argument frequently made is that, had the SSO
members known of the IP claim ex ante while they were
considering the standard for adoption, the SSO members could
have chosen another, non-patented alternative. 86 But once the
standard has been chosen and widely adopted, it may be much
more difficult to avoid the patent. In other words, the adoption
of the standard may increase the bargaining position of the IP
holder. If so, the patent holder may be able to extract, not only
the gains from using its patented technology vis-A-vis other
alternatives, but also a portion of the gains from
standardization generally.
This prospect for ex post "hold-up" is one of the key
rationales for requiring a patent holder to disclose its patents
ex ante and to specify ex ante the royalty rates (if any) that it
intends to seek for the use of its patents. 87 Armed with such
knowledge, the SSO can choose to adopt another alternative if
it believes that the patent holder's prospective royalties are too
high relative to the benefits of using the patented technology.
Whether the SSO would have in fact adopted another
alternative had it known of the patent claims raises a complex
83. For a discussion, see Which Side of the Road Do They Drive On?, at
http://www.travel-library.comgeneral/driving/drive-which-side.html
(last
updated Aug., 2002).
84. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 1, § 35.5b, at 35-37 to 35-46;
SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 12, 104-05, 116-30.
85. The Dell and Rambus cases provide examples. See HOVENKAMP ET
AL., supra note 1, § 35.5b, at 35-37 to 35-46.
86. See, e.g., FTC Unocal Compl., supra note 27, 5; Compl. 65, In re
Rambus, Inc. (Fed. Trade Comm'n June 19, 2002) (No. 9302) [hereinafter FTC
Rambus Compl.], http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/06/rambuscmp.htm (last visited
February 23, 2003).
87. Such disclosure and licensing rules will be discussed in more detail
infra Parts IV.B and IV.C.
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counterfactual question: "What would the SSO have done if the
world had been different?" The answer is likely to be hotly
debated, 88 and depends on the particular facts of the standard
at issue.
The greater the advantages of the (patented)
standard over the alternatives that were considered and
rejected at the time the standard was originally set, the less
likely it is that an alternative would, in fact, have been chosen.
It is true that some SSOs have an absolute policy against
adopting a standard that incorporates a (known) patent. 89 But
this must be interpreted carefully. These SSOs retain the
option of withdrawing the standard entirely, or of not adopting
any standard. There need be no presumption that the SSOs
would have adopted different standards than those adopted
had they known of the existence of relevant patents.
In the more common case, however, the SSO is willing to
adopt a standard incorporating patented technology if there are
good technical reasons for doing so. In such situations, it seems
reasonable to require those who contend that the SSO would
have adopted a different standard, if it had only known of the
existence of the (undisclosed) patent, not only to suggest
another non-patented alternative standard and to demonstrate
that the alternative was acceptable (on a commercial, not
merely a technological, basis), but also to give some basis for
believing that the SSO would have adopted such an alternative
had it known of the existence of the patent. 90
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE "HOLD-UP" CONCERN

The above analysis suggests that the "hold-up" concern has
some natural limitations. First, it is limited to what might be
termed "necessary" or "essential" patents-patents that must
be used in order to practice the standard. Often there are other
"desirable" patents that firms wish to use when making and
selling products that incorporate the standard. But if those
88. Ex post, once a standard has been adopted and a patent reading on
the standard has been asserted, the accused infringers clearly have a strong
incentive to claim that the SSO would have adopted some alternative nonpatented standard had the SSO only known of the existence of the patent. In
our experience, such claims rarely articulate which alternative would have
been adopted, or demonstrate that the SSO would in fact have adopted a
different alternative.
89. The best-known example is the World Wide Web Consortium,
discussed supra note 73.
90. This is likely to require an evaluation of the commercial acceptability
of alternative standards on a quality/cost-adjusted basis.
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patents involve non-standardized features, or "optional"
features that are not required in order to practice the standard,
the "hold-up" problem does not arise.
Second, the "hold-up" concern is limited to patents that are
"implicated by" the standard itself, not necessarily by the
products made that comport with the standard. As noted
above, many standards involve only certain features of the
product. 9 1 For example, an SSO may set a standard for the
physical size and pin assignment of a new generation of
memory chip. 92 The standard determines those particular
characteristics of the chip. But there are many other features
of the chip that are not standardized. Some of those features
may themselves be patented. Adoption of the standard does
not affect such independent patent claims.
For example, a basic patent on the integrated circuit (e.g.,
Texas Instruments's original Kilby patent) covers all integrated
circuits, regardless of the physical size and pin assignment of
the chip. 93 Where such basic patents exist, the new generation
chip infringes on the basic patent regardless of which pinassignment standard the SSO adopts: The adoption of the
standard does not affect the strength of the IP holder's position.
In such contexts, the "hold-up" problem again does not arise.
Hence, the basic-patent holder should not be precluded from
enforcing its patent against those who use the newly
standardized pin assignment to make chips merely because the
patent holder participated in setting the pin-assignment
standard. This in turn implies that the test should be the
relationship of the patent to the standard,not the relationship
of the patent to the products made that comport with the
94
standard.

91. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.

92. See, e.g., JEDEC

SOLID STATE TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, DOUBLE

(DDR) SDRAM SPECIFICATION 3-7, http://www.jedec.org/
download/search/JESD79R2.pdf (May 2002).
93. For a discussion of the Kilby patent and its significance, see Texas
Instruments,
About
Jack,
at
http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/kilbyctr/
jackbuilt.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
94. It is only when the standard is effectively coextensive with the product
that these two inquiries yield the same answer.
Moreover, there may be patents on what might be termed "optional"
features of the product-features that, though they may be commercially
desirable, are not necessary to practice the standard. Here again, the "lock-in"
concern is not an issue, because a firm can avoid the patent while still
complying with the standard by eliminating the optional feature.
DATA

RATE
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Third, in many industries in which standards play an
important role, the fast pace of technological change drives the
continual redesign and reengineering of products.
For
example, the product life cycle in the semiconductor industry is
reported to be as low as ten months. 95 Therefore, even if there
may be some "lock-in" of earlier designs, once the existence of
the patent is disclosed, the SSO has the opportunity to revise
the standards, and manufacturers have the opportunity to
redesign their products to avoid incorporating the patented
features. In other words, the extent of "lock-in" may be limited
by the pace of technological change.
E. "MANIPULATION" OF STANDARDS: ACTIVE AND PASSIVE
CONDUCT

The "hold-up" concern is particularly present in two
paradigm cases of what might be termed "active" manipulation.
In the first case, the patent holder participates in the SSO and
steers the standard toward the claims of one of its existing
patents or pending patent application, in an effort to "capture"
the standard within the claims of its IP. In the second case, the
patent holder modifies a pending patent application so that the
claims of the pending patent read more closely on the proposed
standard (or, more precisely, on future products that comport
with the standard).
The pejorative use of the term "manipulation," to some
extent begs the question. It assumes what needs to be shown:
namely, that the rationale behind the patent holder's conduct
constitutes an improper effort to "capture" the standard. The
discussion above 96 of the reasons why different firms might
prefer different alternative standards-whether because of
divergent technical beliefs, differences in comparative
advantage, or intellectual property issues-suggests that
distinguishing between intentional "manipulation" and less
sinister motives may be difficult.
But in many cases, the concern is not with "active" conduct
(as above), but with "passive" conduct: the failure to disclose
patent rights that may read on the standard being considered.
The issue then becomes whether "active" and "passive" conduct
should be treated differently. One obvious difference is that
95. See Tom Dellecave Jr., Charged With Change, Information Week,
http://www.informationweek.com/545/500elec.htm (Sept. 18, 1995).
96. See supra Part III.A.
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"passive" conduct has a much lower prospect for manipulation
97
of the standards-setting process or its outcome.
IV. SSO IP RULES: MAKING THE CASE FOR CLARITY
A. SSOS AND IP RULES: EFFECT ON PARTICIPATION AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

Many, if not most, SSOs have policies that address the
interplay between the standards they adopt and the IP rights of
participants.9 8 These policies take several forms. Some policies
constrain the SSO itself and the standards that it can adopt (or
maintain). 99 Other policies seek to impose duties or obligations
on SSO participants.' 0 0
1. Rules Constraining the SSO Itself
Some (but by no means all) SSOs have policies that
prevent the SSO from adopting standards on which some
individual or entity has (or claims to have) a patent. 101 Some of
these policies are absolute, but most allow exceptions if the
patent holder declares that it is willing to license its patent,
whether royalty-free or on certain terms, to those making
products that comport with the standard. 10 2 Similarly, some
SSOs have policies that call for the SSO to withdraw previously
approved standards if it is subsequently discovered that there
10 3
is a patent that reads on the standard.
These policies-which might be termed "adoption
policies"-impose restrictions on the SSO itself, not on the
patent holder. To some extent, this is a consequence of the fact
97. This is because "active" conduct can steer the SSO to adopting a
patented standard, while "passive" conduct can at most "capture" a standard
that the SSO was willing to adopt in any case.
98.

See Lemley, supra note 17, at 1903-06, 1973-75.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Professor Lemley, in an overview of SSOs, asks, "Can Standard
Include IP?" Id. at 1973.
102. "[T]wenty-nine of the thirty-six SSOs with [patent licensing] policies
required members to license their patent rights on ['reasonable and nondiscriminatory'] terms." Id. at 1906.

103. According to Professor Lemley's survey, examples include
CEN/CENELEC ("RAND to entire world required or standard is withdrawn");
ECMA ("RAND, or the standard will be cancelled"); J Consortium ("RAND, or
the standard will be referred back to Committee for consideration"); and
JEDEC ("RAND, or possible withdrawal of the standard"). Id. at 1974.

2003]

STANDARDS SETTING AND ANTITRUST

1943

that private SSOs are voluntary entities. A voluntary SSO
cannot bind the rights of non-participants. If an SSO adopts a
standard and subsequently discovers that a non-participant
has a patent that reads on the standard, the SSO cannot
compel the non-participant to relinquish its patent rights. All
the SSO can do is elect to "de-establish" the standard.
Such rules, however, often only address part of the issue.
They state what the SSO must do if and when it learns of a
relevant patent, but this begs the question of how the SSO
comes to know of the existence of a relevant patent. We turn to
that issue next.
2. Rules Affecting Participants
The more significant rules or policies impose certain
obligations on SSO participants. These policies take three
main forms: search rules, disclosure rules, and licensing rules.
Under a search and/or disclosure rule, the question is "to what
extent does a participant in an SSO have an obligation to
search for, and/or to disclose, the existence of IP (whether
issued or pending, whether its own or belonging to others) that
may relate to a (proposed or issued) standard?" Under a
licensing rule, the question is "to what extent does a
participating IP holder have an obligation to license its IP to
those practicing the standard, and on what terms?"
The terms of such policies vary widely across different
SSOs, as demonstrated by the results of a recent survey by
Professor Mark Lemley. 10 4 His survey results indicate that a
"one size fits all" policy approach is inappropriate.
Search and disclosure rules clearly impose burdens on SSO
participants.
More significantly, they impose asymmetric
burdens and benefits. The burdens fall primarily, if not
exclusively, on IP holders. The benefits accrue primarily to the
users of the standard.
Search and disclosure rules rarely pose problems when the
participants in the SSO are roughly symmetrically situated. In
such circumstances, firms realize that they will incur the
burdens sometimes (when their IP is implicated by a proposed
standard) but reap the benefits other times. But in contexts
where the participants in the SSO are not symmetrically
situated-and, in particular, where some participants are pureplay technology companies (suppliers of IP) and others are
104. Id. at 1904-06, 1973-75.
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primarily users of others' IP-then the problem of conflicting
interests can become acute.
3. Participation Constraints
Given the consequences of SSO rules and the nature of
voluntary participation, SSOs must tread warily. IP holders
must believe that their interests will be protected in the
standards-setting process, or they may choose not to
participate. 10 5 Indeed, the proliferation of voluntary specialpurpose consortia in many technological areas means that a
number of different SSOs, to a greater or lesser extent,
"compete" with one another to develop standards. 10 6 Thus, IP
holders that believe that a particular SSO does not adequately
protect their interests may be in a position to leave that SSO
and participate in another SSO that provides better protection
for their IP rights.
SSO competition, however, is not a panacea for resolving
these concerns. Leaving the SSO often entails foregoing any
opportunity to affect the SSO's decision. Especially when the
IP holder "wears multiple hats" (as both an IP holder and a
participant in the product market, whether as a buyer or
seller), the holder often faces a significant conflict between
these different roles. As an IP holder, the firm may believe
that the SSO's policies provide inadequate protection for its IP.
But leaving the SSO to avoid being bound by the SSO's policies
may prove difficult if the firm believes that it needs to
participate in the standards-setting process in its other role(s).
Consequently,
the
(apparent)
"voluntariness"
of
participation in SSOs may be illusory. Even firms with
significant IP portfolios may conclude that they have little
practical choice but to participate in certain SSOs; the SSO
may be "the only game in town." In particular, the SSO may
make standards decisions that significantly affect the firm's
participation in the product market. 10 7 As such, the firm may
have a business need to participate in the SSO that outweighs
the risks that participation imposes on its IP portfolio.
One concern raised by this pragmatic constraint on firms'
105. This factor differentiates voluntary SSOs from regulatory agencies.
106. In 1998, Sun Microsystems participated in eighty-seven different
SSOs, and "there are dozens of different SSOs associated with Internet
technical standards alone." Lemley, supra note 17, at 1907.
107. For example, a standard for next-generation DRAM chips affects both
DRAM manufacturers and DRAM purchasers.
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ability to leave an SSO is that other SSO participants who are
aware of this factor may take advantage of the firm's
predicament by setting onerous rules that adversely affect the
IP holders' interests. For instance, the SSO may adopt rules
that impose a burden that almost, but not quite, causes the IP
holder to elect to quit.
B. SEARCH AND DISCLOSURE RULES: REPRESENTATION AND
BURDEN

Firms are represented at SSOs by individuals. 0 8 The
representatives are typically chosen for their technological
knowledge of the issue under discussion. 10 9 A large firm may
have hundreds of such representatives attending different SSO
meetings. 110 The representatives are not likely to be aware of
the scope of their firms' patent portfolios. "' They are even less
likely to be aware of their firms' pending patent applications.
Moreover, determining whether a particular patent reads on a
proposed standard is often a complex task in claims
construction and patent interpretation. 1 2 It is rare for
representatives to have both the requisite knowledge and the
relevant expertise to evaluate patent claims.
1. Search
The fact that firms' representatives to the SSO often have
limited knowledge of their firms' patent portfolios implies that
the scope of the obligation (if any) to search for potentially
relevant patents is extremely important. As a conceptual
matter, there clearly is a continuum of possible search and
disclosure rules that might be adopted. At one extreme of the
continuum, the representatives may have no search or
disclosure obligations whatsoever. Or the representatives
might merely have an obligation to disclose patents (and/or
patent applications) of which they personally are aware and
which they personally believe may implicate the standard. At
the other extreme, one might impose on the firm a "disclose it
108. This and the following points are based on our discussions with senior
management at major high-tech firms, including Texas Instruments and
Hewlett-Packard. See also Lemley, supra note 17, at 1907.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89
(1996).
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or lose it" obligation to search for and disclose all potentially
relevant patents (or pending applications). Under such a
proposal, a firm might be required to certify that it had
searched for and disclosed all of its relevant IP. The
certification would preclude the firm from subsequently
asserting any undisclosed IP.
An obligation to search for "implicated" IP can be
extremely onerous. It is a major task to search a patent
database and to compare it against the proposed standard.
Patent searching is especially problematic when the standard
evolves over time. Further, it is often difficult to know whether
a patent "reads on" a proposed standard, as that may entail a
major effort at claims construction and interpretation.' 13
A search requirement is especially onerous for IP owners
who have substantial numbers of patents. Many firms in hightech industries have thousands of patents, hundreds of which
may be potentially relevant to a proposed standard."l 4
Moreover, with the advent of computerized patent
databases, there is no particular reason why the patent holder
has any comparative advantage over other SSO participants in
searching for its potentially relevant patents. 1 5 As such, one
would expect that it would be more cost-effective for the SSO to
take on the responsibility of searching for potentially relevant
patents, raising the necessary funds to pay for such searches by
charging a fee to SSO participants. 1 6 One key virtue of such
113.

Id. In the closely-analogous licensing context, determining whether a

patent holder's patent portfolio reads on a (prospective) licensee's products can

be extremely expensive and time consuming, taking a year of effort and
hundreds of engineering man-hours. See Grindley & Teece, supra note 68, at
19, n.42.
114. For example, IBM received over 22,000 patents during the 1993-2002
period, and has an active portfolio of 21,000 U.S. patents and 38,000 patents
worldwide. IBM, State-of-the-Art Patent Portfolio, http://www.ibm.com/ibm/

licensing/patents/portfolio.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
115. The main caveat here is pending patent applications. Under current
U.S. law, most (but not all) pending applications are "thrown open" for public
inspection eighteen months after filing. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
Until that date, the application is confidential, and others are not in a position
to know whether such an application has been filed. See id. §122(a).
116. The economic cost of performing searches is not eliminated when the
obligation to search is imposed on SSO members; it just means that the costs
are borne by patent holders rather than being spread across all SSO
participants. As such, an SSO-based search coupled with a participation fee to
finance the search has the potential for allocating the cost of conducting the
search more equitably across the various SSO participants than a policy that
requires each SSO participant to search its own patents.
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an approach (rather than relying on SSO members to search
their own patent portfolios1 17) is that an SSO-conducted search
would have a much better chance of finding potentially relevant
patents that did not belong to SSO participants.
In addition, the scope of any duty to search is difficult to
specify in advance.
Is a "good faith" effort to discover
potentially relevant patents sufficient?
How does one
determine whether a particular search was adequate? At what
stage during the standards-setting process must a search be
made? On the one hand, earlier disclosure is (other things
equal) preferable. 1 8 On the other hand, the proposed standard
itself is likely to evolve over time, meaning the target of the
search-patents within the proposed standard's scope-will
also change over time and trying to conduct a patent search
against such a "moving target" is difficult. 119
Professor Lemley's survey of SSO rules demonstrates that,
of the twenty-one SSOs that he studied that addressed the
question whether there was a duty to search, seventeen
imposed no duty to search, and one had what Professor Lemley
called a "de facto" duty (in the sense that the patent holder
agreed not to sue users of the standard for any patents not
disclosed to the SSO). 120 The European Telecommunications
Standards Institute follows the European Community policy
which (as Professor Lemley puts it) "requires that the patent
owner conduct a search unless the standard-setting body
commits to do the search itself."12 1 The Frame Relay Forum
122
required a "reasonable" search.
According to Professor Lemley, only one U.S.-based SSO,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
117.

Another alternative

is to impose on each SSO participant the

obligation to search, not only its own patent portfolio, but also the publicly
available information (such as patent databases), for potentially relevant
patents belonging to others. The key advantage of such a proposal is that
multiple searches, conducted by different individuals or firms, are more likely
to discover a greater number of potentially relevant patents, especially since
the issue of whether a particular patent is or is not relevant to the proposed

standard is likely to be one on which parties can differ. The obvious
disadvantage is the likely resulting duplication of effort.
118. Early disclosure allows the SSO to explore the relative merits of
patented and non-patented alternatives in a timely fashion.

119.

This last issue is especially significant with respect to pending patent

applications, which themselves are "moving targets."

120. Lemley, supra note 17, at 1905, 1973-75, 1978 n.387.
121.
122.

Id. at 1977 n.373.
Id. at 1905.
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formerly the National Bureau of Standards, imposes a more
extensive duty to search. 123 And NIST appears to be the
exception that proves the rule, since NIST appears to have
virtually no role in
actually setting the sorts of standards that
124
are at issue here.
2. Disclosure
Like search rules, the scope of any disclosure obligation is
also difficult to pin down in advance. 125 There are two
difficulties with the scope of a disclosure obligation. First,
overdisclosure can be as problematic as underdisclosure. To
take an extreme example, a firm could simply list all of its
issued patents and tell the SSO that it is up to the SSO to
determine whether any of those patents are potentially
relevant to the proposed standard. Such a "core dump" type of
disclosure is not very helpful. (Nevertheless, if the SSO has a
stringent disclosure policy and there are significant sanctions
for failure to disclose, the only safe course for a firm with
valuable IP may be to make such an overdisclosure.)
Second, the question whether a particular patent does or
does not read on a proposed standard is often unclear, involving
claim construction and interpretation. 2 6 Is disclosure of the
123. Id.
124. The NIST website indicates that "[o]ur laboratories have the job of
developing ever more accurate ways to measure length, time, mass,
temperature, and the other physical quantities that are fundamental to all
types of technology." See NIST, Standards, at http://www.nist.gov/publicaffairs/standards.htm#Documentary (last updated Mar. 18, 2002). The NIST

website also indicates, "In the United States, responsibility for setting product
and process standards rests almost exclusively with the private sector ...
Because of its measurement expertise and its impartiality, NIST is called

upon to provide technical support that contributes to the development of highquality domestic and international standards." Id.
According to the 2000 "Memorandum of Understanding" between NIST

and ANSI, "NIST's role ... is to coordinate Federal activities in voluntary
standards and to ensure adequate representation of U.S. interests in all
relevant
international
standards
organizations."
See NIST/ANSI

Memorandum of Understanding, http://ts.nist.gov/ts/htdocs/210/ansimou.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003).

Also, "NIST facilitates information exchange

between Federal agencies and the private sector on voluntary standards
activities ....It works with ANSI, Federal agencies, and the private sector to
ensure that U.S. interests can participate appropriately in international

standards activities to enhance U.S. international competitiveness." Id.
125. See discussion infra Part IV.E for why it is important that the scope of
any disclosure obligation be clearly specified.
126. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89
(1996).
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existence of the patent enough, or does the patent holder have
an obligation to explain why (or how) it believes that the patent
reads on the standard?
Many SSOs explicitly disclaim any effort to interpret the
patent or to determine whether or not a patent reads on a
proposed standard. 127 This unwillingness is not surprising,
given that SSOs themselves are generally not comprised of
patent lawyers and rendering opinions would increase the
SSO's potential liability exposure should the SSO get it
wrong. 128
But once a patent has been disclosed, the SSO must
determine whether or not to adopt the standard. If the SSO
really is concerned about the prospect that a patent reads on a
standard, there would appear to be little choice but to try to
interpret the patent. The SSO itself (as an entity) may choose
not to do so, instead leaving it up to the members of the SSO
committee considering the standard to determine whether or
not to adopt the proposed standard despite the knowledge of
the potentially relevant patent.
A "disclose it or lose it" policy is likely (at a minimum) to
delay the adoption of a proposed standard. Rational corporate
and/or patent counsel would likely require that participation
and subsequent disclosures would have to be "vetted" by patent
counsel, because the risk of inadvertently losing the ability to
enforce an important patent would otherwise be significant.
Economics suggests that firms will rationally err on the side of
overdisclosure, 129 which will force the SSO to examine large
IEEE STANDARDS ASS'N,
127. See, e.g.,
COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,

COMMENTS

REGARDING

at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/intelpropertycomments/ieee.pdf (Apr. 17, 2002) (noting that "the
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)] working group
[developing the proposed standard] does not attempt to determine whether"
the patent applies "to the proposed standard"). The IEEE provides the
following "public notice" in connection with its standards: "The IEEE shall not
be responsible for identifying patents for which a license may be required by
an IEEE standard or for conducting inquiries into the legal validity or scope of
those patents that are brought to its attention." See IEEE, IEEE-SA
at
http:
§
6.3.1,
Manual,
Operations
Board
Standards
//standards.ieee.org/guides/opman/sect6.html (last modified Jan. 18, 2002).
128. The concern is that, if the SSO undertakes such an investigation and
concludes that the patent does not read on the standard, users of the standard
who are accused of infringing a patent could sue the SSO for negligence should
the SSO's evaluation later prove incorrect. Defending against such negligence
claims can be costly, even if the SSO were to ultimately prevail on the merits.
129. The economic logic here is that, while both under- and over-disclosure
impose costs on the firm, the private costs of underdisclosure (in the form of
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numbers of marginally relevant patents in order to determine
the patent's significance.
More significantly, a "disclose it or lose it" policy is likely to
deter firms with significant IP portfolios from participating in
an SSO that has such a policy. In many cases, the risk of losing
the ability to enforce patents is likely to outweigh the gains the
firm receives from participating in the standards-setting
process. This is especially true since firms can get most of the
benefits from standardization by adhering to the standard once
set, even if they do not participate in setting the standard.
However, such firms (which presumably have large IP
portfolios because they have successfully engaged in significant
R&D may be precisely the firms whose participation in the
standards-setting process is the most significant
and whose
130
absence would most likely be detrimental.
Again, the results of the Lemley survey are enlightening.
Of the thirty-six SSOs surveyed that currently have some
policy regarding IP, only twenty-four "imposed either an
express or implied obligation that members disclose IP rights of
which they are aware," though others "generally imposed other
conditions that obviated the need for disclosure." 131 Of those
the prospect that the firm will be found to have waived its right to assert its
patents) are likely to outweigh the private costs of overdisclosure.
130. Professor Janice Mueller argues, "An expansive disclosure
requirement is not likely to chill industry participation in standards-setting,
because 'participation in standards-setting is motivated by commercial selfinterest and is not a form of community service." Mueller, supra note 27, at
933 (internal citation omitted). This is an unsubstantiated empirical claim,
for which Professor Mueller provides no basis. Moreover, it is precisely
because participation is "motivated by commercial self interest" that the SSO
has to be concerned that onerous search and disclosure rules can tip the
balance of the participate-versus-do-not-participate cost-benefit calculation
and will thereby cause some participants to elect not to participate.
Yet Professor Mueller's argument contains a grain of truth. It may well
be, as discussed above, that some firms believe that they have little choice but
to participate in certain "voluntary" SSOs, despite the risk to their valuable
IP, because the SSO is "the only game in town." However, we draw a very
different conclusion than Professor Mueller does. Her conclusion is that SSOs
can and should impose stringent search and disclosure rules, and stringent
sanctions for non-disclosure, in order to ensure that the users of the standard
can rest assured that their use of the standard will not infringe other
participants' patents. Id. at 945-46. By contrast, we are concerned that such
rules will inappropriately favor the users of IP and harm the owners of IP,
who may have little realistic choice but to participate. As discussed in more
detail in the Appendix infra, we believe that a bias in favor of the users of a
standard can be societally inefficient.
131. Lemley, supra note 17, at 1904.
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that imposed a duty, six explicitly addressed the question
whether the duty to disclose also included pending patent
applications.1 32 The rules of those six were mixed, with four
requiring disclosure of all pending applications, one requiring
disclosure only of already-published applications, and one
33
requiring disclosure only from the proponent of the standard. 1
The combination of search and disclosure obligations in
Professor Lemley's survey is particularly striking. While most
SSOs imposed a duty to disclose known relevant patents, only
four required a search. 134 In other words, in the vast majority
of cases the participant has a duty to disclose patents of which
it is aware, but has no affirmative duty to search its firm's
patent portfolio for potentially relevant patents.
It can be argued that imposing disclosure duties without
requiring a patent search may do little or nothing to protect
other SSO participants, or users of the standard, from future
patent infringement claims. Similarly, such a policy may also
encourage "willful ignorance" on behalf of patent holders. If a
firm's representative to the SSO is aware of relevant patents
(and/or patent applications), the representative must disclose
them, so the obvious course of action is either to choose not to
look for potentially relevant patents and thus remain ignorant
of possible patent claims, or to send a representative who has
not been informed of such patents to the SSO meetings.
These arguments, while in some sense clearly correct,
ignore three considerations. First, imposing a duty to disclose
known patents is relatively costless, while imposing a duty to
search for potentially relevant patents can be quite costly to
firms with significant patent portfolios. Second, as noted
above,1 35 the individual representatives to an SSO are typically
chosen for their engineering expertise, not for their knowledge
Third, if the firm's
of their firms' patent portfolios.
representative is not aware of its firm's patents that potentially
read on the proposed standard, then the representative
logically cannot be in a position to try to "actively" manipulate
1 36
the standards-setting process in ways that benefit its firm.
132.
133.

134.
require
135.
136.

Id. at 1905.
Id.

Id. at 1905, 1961 n.298 ("[O]nly four out of twenty-four SSOs that
disclosure impose a search obligation.").
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
As such, this situation is in many ways akin to the situation in which

a non-participant has a potentially relevant patent. It is widely acknowledged
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It is worth noting that, based on the results of Professor
Lemley's survey, it appears that the search and disclosure rules
of the two SSOs involved in two controversies that have
received a significant amount of attention-the Video
Electronics Standards Association (VESA) in In Re Dell 137 and
the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) in the
Rambus matter138-are significantly more stringent (in the
sense of purportedly imposing strong duties on patent holders)
than appears to be the norm. 139 VESA rules required the
that SSO rules cannot bind non-participants. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 17,
at 1945 ("Because SSO rules necessarily bind only members of the SSO, exit is
always an option.").
137. See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
138. See FTC Rambus Compl., supra note 86.
139. We are aware that the question as to what the scope of the search and
disclosure rules of VESA and JEDEC actually were, both on paper and as
applied in practice, is a hotly disputed topic. For example, Infmeon and the
FTC argued that JEDEC rules required disclosure of all pending patent
applications that "might be involved in" a proposed standard. See id.
21.
Rambus argued (1) that prior to 1993 the JEDEC rules did not require
disclosure of pending patent applications (but only sought disclosure of issued
patents), (2) that the October 1993 "Manual of Practice and Procedure" that
indicated that disclosure of pending patent applications was required was an
internal manual for the use of JEDEC personnel and committee chairmen and
was not disseminated to rank-and-file members such as Rambus, (3) that the
1995 Member's Manual, which (unlike the 1993 Manual) was disseminated to
JEDEC members, required the disclosure of patent applications by "first
presenters" of technology for standardization, thus supporting the conclusion
that other JEDEC members not making such a presentation had no similar
obligation, (4) that Rambus was never informed that the policy had been
changed to require that all members disclose pending patent applications, (5)
that the chairman of the JEDEC committee in which Rambus participated
consistently displayed the older policy (which sought disclosure only of issued
patents, not of pending patent applications) at all of the meetings that
Rambus attended, so that Rambus had a good-faith belief that the policy only
sought disclosure of issued patents, and (6) that, throughout the relevant
period, JEDEC rules only sought disclosure of patents or pending patent
applications the use of which was "required" in order to practice the standard.
See Answer of Respondent Rambus, Inc., In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302 (July
29, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/020729arri.pdf (last visited
Mar. 26, 2003).
We note that the Federal Circuit has recently ruled, in connection with
Infineon's claim that Rambus committed fraud on JEDEC by failing to disclose
its patent applications, that Rambus did not commit fraud, because the
technology claimed in its patent applications while it was a member of JEDEC
was not required in order to practice the JEDEC SDRAM and DDR SDRAM
standards. See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1421, at *39-*66 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Resolving this disputed factual issue would take us too far afield. But the
example illustrates that one key factor is the clarity of the search and
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representative to certify that its firm did not have any relevant
patents;14 0 the 1993 JEDEC 14Manual
of Procedure required
1
disclosure of pending patents.
C. LICENSING POLICIES
In addition to search and disclosure policies, many SSOs
have what might be termed "licensing policies." Such policies
most commonly require participating IP holders whose patents
have been identified as being relevant to the proposed standard
to agree to license whichever patents are "necessary" to make
products that comply with the standard to anyone seeking a
license. 142 The IP holder must typically also agree to license its
patents either royalty-free or on "reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms." If the patent holder is not willing to
agree to abide by these terms, the SSO will often refuse to
adopt the proposed standard or will withdraw the standard if it
143
has already been promulgated.
1. The "One Patent, One Standard" Problem
The implicit paradigm seems to be that a firm has a single
patent that reads on the proposed standard, and that the task
is to determine the appropriate terms for licensing that
particularpatent. The obvious complication is that, in many
high-tech industries, much licensing does not fit this "one
patent, one product" paradigm. Instead, it is common to see
broad portfolio-wide cross-licenses, often with "balancing
payments" reflecting the difference in value between the firms'
patent portfolios. 144 As discussed in more detail below, such a
practice makes it difficult to determine whether proposed terms
disclosure rules adopted by the SSO, and the extent to which those rules are
clearly conveyed to all participants. We discuss this issue in more detail in
Part IV.E infra.
140. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 1, § 35.5, at 35-37 to 35-38 (Supp.
2003).
141. Id. at 35-38.
142. For example, the IEEE patent policy refers to patents "whose use
would be required to implement the proposed IEEE standard." IEEE, IEEEJA StandardsBoard Bylaws, at http://standards.ieee.org/guides/bylaws/sect67.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (emphasis added). There may be other
patents-for example, patents on product features that are seen as desirable,
but which are not strictly necessary to practice the standard-which relate to
standardized products, but which do not fall within the scope of the licensing
requirement.
143. See examples cited supra note 103.
144. See Grindley & Teece, supra note 68, at 9, 33.
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are "reasonable and non-discriminatory."
2. "Royalty-Free" and "Reasonable Terms"
In some contexts, the patent holder may be willing to
license its patents royalty-free to all interested parties. From
an economic standpoint, this is most likely to occur under one
of two conditions: (1) when the patented technology represents
only a minor improvement over the next-best non-patented
alternative (so that the value of the patent is small), or (2)
when the patent holder will benefit from others' adoption of its
patented technology as a standard because the patent holder
has other complementary capabilities that will enable it to
profit from its innovation in a manner other than collecting
royalties.
The latter is most common when the patent holder is also a
seller in the product market and wants the SSO to adopt the
firm's patented technology as a standard to encourage market
acceptance of its technology and thus of the products that it
sells.
Setting royalty payments at "zero" provides two obvious
economic advantages. First, it has what economists and game
theorists term a "focal point" clarity 145 that other royalty rates
do not have. Once one moves away from zero, no other royalty
rate has any particular reason to commend it in all cases.
There is nothing special about 1%, 3%, or 7%. Instead,
choosing a particular non-zero rate must consider the
particular advantages of the patented technology relative to
non-patented alternatives, which is inherently a fact-specific
investigation.
Second, a royalty-free license is administratively simple
(though determining the scope of the license may not be). By
contrast, a royalty-bearing license requires mechanisms to
monitor sales volume, to pay and collect royalties, and (if
necessary) to audit royalty payments to make sure that the
patent holder has been properly compensated. For both of
these reasons, it is not surprising that a number of SSOs select
"zero" (royalty-free) as the only pre-specified numerical royalty
rate (as opposed to the unspecified "reasonable" alternative,
which does not select a particular number) when setting their

145.

For a discussion of "focal points" and their economic significance, see

THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 111-14 (1960).

2003]

STANDARDS SETTING AND ANTITRUST

1955

licensing policies. 146
Nevertheless, the obvious disadvantage of a "zero" (royaltyfree) license is that it fails to compensate the patent holder for
others' use of its patented technology. From an economic
standpoint, there is no necessary reason why the appropriate
"price" (royalty rate) for use of the patented technology should
be zero, as it is in a royalty-free. license, merely because that
technology was incorporated into a standard. Presumably, the
SSO adopted the patented technology as a standard, rather
than some other alternative, because it believed that using the
patented technology was superior to the alternatives. As such,
the general economic presumption is that the appropriate price
would be greaterthan zero. Thus, though SSOs list royalty-free
licenses as one option (indeed, the only numerically prespecified option), there is and should be no presumption that
"zero" (royalty-free) is the appropriate price for patented
technology that reads on a standard.
3. "Reasonable Terms": When Announced?
One key issue concerning patents is whether the patent
holder must announce the terms for a patent license in
advance.
If so, there are potential antitrust concerns.
Typically, the other participants in the SSO are the most likely
potential licensees for the patent. 147 This raises the potential
for collusive, oligopolistic "price fixing" in the technology
market. The SSO members would, in effect, say to the patent
holder, "We will collectively reject a standard that incorporates
your patented technology unless you agree to license it to us at
pre-specified rates that we collectively find acceptable." In
148
other contexts, this clearly would amount to a group boycott.
146. Professor Lemley's survey of SSO licensing practices is misleading in
this regard. For example, he lists W3C as having a "[r]oyalty-free license
requested but not required; RAND as alternative" licensing policy. Lemley,
supra note 17, at 1973. But he lists JEDEC as an SSO with a "RAND" policy.
See id. at 1974. The current JEDEC policy in fact specifies that the patent
holder must agree to license either royalty-free or on RAND terms. See
JEDEC, JEDEC Manual of Organizationand Procedure, at 20, Annex A.1, at
http://www.jedec.org/Home/manuals/JM21L.pdf (July 2002). Our review of the
licensing policies of other SSOs confirms that many other SSOs have similar
policies.
147. The prospective licensees are the firms that intend to manufacture
and sell the standardized products. As noted above, such firms are likely to
participate in the standards-setting process.
148. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 1, § 35.6, at 35-46 to 35-54.3
(Supp. 2003).
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If advance notice of the patent license's terms is not given,
the requirement that the licensing terms be "reasonable" may
have little "teeth." What the patent holder believes is
"reasonable" may strike potential licensees as excessive. 149 One
difficulty is that circumstances (and thus whether a particular
rate is "reasonable") vary, not only across different patents and
No single rate is
different technology but over time.
"reasonable."
The more significant difficulty is that the adoption of a
standard can affect the bargaining position of the parties. Ex
149. Professor Lemley discusses the fact that most SSO's "RAND" policies
provide little guidance as to "what those obligations mean in practice."
Lemley, supra note 17, at 1906. He proposes that SSOs should "give content
to the reasonable and nondiscriminatory licensing requirement." Id. at 1964,
1964-67.
We sympathize with Professor Lemley's concern that having a "RAND"
policy without more may do little to provide guidance as to the rates that the
patent holder can charge. However, a RAND commitment does constrain the
patent holder in other significant ways.
If a standard is adopted (and especially if that standard becomes the
industry norm), manufacturers want the ability to make products that
comport with that norm/standard. As such, they would be concerned if patent
holders could "pick and choose" by licensing some firms and refusing to license
others. (This concern is especially significant if the patent holder itself
competes in the product market; in that event, the patent holder could assert
its patent to exclude others from competing, thereby reserving the market to
itself.) And firms are concerned, not merely about obtaining a license, but
about obtaining a license on terms that enable them to compete on a "level
playing field."
A patent holder's commitment to license any interested party on
(unspecified) RAND terms ensures (a) that all potential licensees can obtain a
license (if they are willing to pay the royalty rates sought), and (b) that all will
be offered the same terms and will be assured the opportunity to obtain a
license without being put at a comparative disadvantage. Such a commitment
to license on RAND terms limits the patent holder's ability to play potential
licensees against one another.
But once such a "level playing field" is attained, then much of the concern
that the prospective licensees have about their potential competitive position
disappears. To be sure, firms would prefer not have to pay royalties, just as
they would prefer not to have to pay their rent or their income taxes. But so
long as every firm must pay, then the cost of the royalties can be built into the
price of the product being sold, just as the cost of the raw materials and labor
needed to make and sell the product is likewise built into the price. That is,
prospective licensees may rationally be far more concerned about the "nondiscriminatory" aspect of the RAND requirement than they are about the
"reasonable" aspect.
This, in turn, implies that from an economic and organizational behavior
perspective, it is quite rational for SSOs to pay much more attention to the
requirement that licenses be available on (unspecified) RAND terms than they
pay to the question of what the "reasonable" royalty rates should be.
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ante, before an SSO adopts a standard, the patented technology
may be only slightly better than the alternatives. Suppose, for
instance, that there are two alternatives: an unpatented publicdomain technology, and a patented technology that, if adopted,
would result in a 5% cost savings. If the parties were to
negotiate ex ante over royalty rates, one would expect that the
negotiated rate would be no more than 5%, and likely less.
Once the patented technology is adopted as a standard,
however, firms may commit to the standard and invest in
complementary assets needed to make and produce the newly
standardized products. Ex post, the cost of switching to the
unpatented alternative may now be much greater, as the
industry is "locked in" to the patented standard. Suppose, for
example, that firms in the industry would find it worthwhile to
switch only if the patent holder demanded greater than a 20%
royalty. Then the patent holder may be able to extract (say) a
15% royalty ex post, despite the fact that the ex ante value of
the patented technology is no more than 5%.
The above discussion implies that a royalty rate may be
reasonable ex post (in the sense that it could be agreed to in an
arm's length negotiation between a willing licensor and a
willing, albeit reluctant, licensee) but not reasonable ex ante.
4. "Reasonable" Terms: How Determined?
In any case, many if not most SSOs do not get involved in
determining 150 whether
proposed
license
terms
are
"reasonable."
Indeed, most SSOs do not require the patent
holder to announce its proposed license terms in advance of
150. To our knowledge, most SSOs do not try to determine whether
proposed terms are "reasonable," whether ex ante or ex post. For example, the
IEEE Public Notice explicitly says, "The IEEE makes no representation as to
the reasonableness of rates and/or terms and conditions of the license
agreements offered by patent holders." IEEE, IEEE-SA Standards Board
Operations Manual cl. 6.3.1, at http://standards.ieee.org/guides/opman/sect6.
html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
ANSI does not require that terms be specified in advance, but the ANSI
Board of Standards Review will review claims that the royalties being sought
are not "reasonable."
IMPLEMENTATION OF

See AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., GUIDELINES FOR
THE ANSI PATENT POLICY, http://public.ansi.org/

ansionline/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%2ONational%20
Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/
(last updated Mar.,
2003); see also Lemley, supra note 17, at 1906 ("While 'reasonable and
nondiscriminatory licensing' thus appears to be the majority rule among SSOs
with a patent policy, relatively few SSOs gave much explanation of what those
terms mean or how licensing disputes would be resolved.").
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adopting the standard, but merely require a statement that the
patent holder, is willing to license on "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" terms. 151 Instead, royalty rates are left to the
parties for negotiation.
There are four likely reasons that SSOs avoid addressing
the reasonableness of licensing terms. First, determining
whether a particular rate is "reasonable" often goes beyond the
competence and/or expertise of the SSO or its participants. The
"reasonableness" of royalty rates is an economic or business
issue, not a technical one. The SSO representatives, generally
chosen for their technical knowledge of the technology being
standardized, frequently have little or no experience or
expertise in negotiating royalty rates or determining what an
52
appropriate rate should be.'
Second, trying to determine an appropriate royalty rate is
often difficult when technology is changing rapidly, as is often
the case in the context of standards for the next-generation of
products. From an economic standpoint, patent holders are
naturally reluctant to quote a royalty rate for their patents in
advance. 53 This is especially true because of the asymmetric
(one-way) nature of the commitment. Asking the patent holder
to commit to a royalty rate prior to the standard's adoption
would, presumably, be binding on the patent holder, in the
sense that the patent holder could not increase the rate, though
it could always agree to accept a lower royalty. But the rate,
would not be binding on the prospective licensees. They would
have made no commitment to take a license, to agree to pay
royalties. Not surprisingly, patent holders are reluctant to
constrain their future negotiating position in such an
asymmetric fashion.
Third, there are potential antitrust issues that might arise
if the SSO (or its members, as potential licensees of the patent)
were to try 154to determine whether a proposed rate was
"reasonable."
Antitrust issues clearly would arise if the SSO
151.

For a survey of licensing policies, see Lemley, supra note 17, at 1906,

1973-75.
152. We obtained this information in conversations with senior
management at several major semiconductor companies.
153. In large part, this is because they cannot be aware of the scope of the

ultimately issued patents, and thus of what it is that they will be licensing.
154. The concern is that the SSO manufacturer members are often the
most likely licensees of the patented technology, and collective action by
manufacturers could amount to collusive buyer-side price fixing in the
technology market.
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explicitly conditioned its acceptance (or rejection) of a proposed
standard implicating a patent on the asked-for royalty rates.
Indeed, even asking the patent holder to announce its proposed
rates in advance, and then having the SSO determine whether
or not to adopt the standard in light of the announced rates,
may be problematic from an antitrust standpoint.
Fourth, SSOs are aware that the issue of royalty rates pits
the interests of some participants (the patent holders) against
those of other participants (the prospective licensees), and the
SSOs do not want to "take sides" in such matters.
Unfortunately, the reluctance of SSOs to get involved in
determining (ex ante or ex post) whether proposed licensing
terms are "reasonable" can lead to an ex post situation in
which: (1) a standard has been adopted; (2) a participant has a
patent that reads on the standard; (3) the patent holder
contends that it is willing to license its patent on "reasonable"
terms (albeit at rates that were not announced in advance); and
(4) the users of the standard, as prospective licensees, protest
that the royalty rates are unacceptably high and are thus
anything but "reasonable."
5. Antitrust Remedies
In our view, the antitrust authorities have shown what we
believe to be an unfortunate tendency to propose royalty-free as
a remedy in cases where the antitrust authorities have
contended that the patent holder violated the antitrust laws by
failing to disclose its patents (or pending patent applications).
to
For example, the In Re Dell consent decree called for Dell 155
basis.
royalty-free
a
on
patent
VESA
its
use
to
allow others
The recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) complaint against
Rambus effectively seeks to compel Rambus not to enforce its
patents against users of the JEDEC synchronous dynamic
random access memory (SDRAM) and double data rate (DDR)
SDRAM standards; if successful, the action amounts to forcing

155. See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 619-23 (1996). Our
understanding (based on discussions the authors had with parties familiar
with the case) is that one likely explanation for Dell's willingness to agree to
this remedy is that, by the time of the consent decree, the VESA bus standard
at issue was obsolescent and rapidly becoming obsolete. We also understand
(on the same basis) that others had challenged the validity of Dell's patents.
Thus, Dell may not have been giving up much in the way of potential revenue
by agreeing to license its patents on a royalty-free basis in order to settle the
matter.
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a royalty-free license on Rambus. 156
Such a remedy typically goes far beyond the SSO's
requirements, which allow a patent holder to agree to license
its patent royalty-free, but also generally allow a patent holder
to agree to license on "reasonable and non-discriminatory"
royalty-bearing terms. 157 The above analysis suggests that a
more appropriate remedy would be to require a patent holder to
license its patent to others on terms that are "reasonable" in
the ex ante sense.
To be sure, it can be difficult to determine ex post what the
ex ante "reasonable" terms would be.
It is far easier
administratively to propose a royalty-free license as a remedy.
The courts are routinely asked, however, to determine ex ante
reasonable royalty rates in the context of patent infringement
damages. 158 We know of no reason why the analysis that courts
use in patent damages cases, such as the well-known Georgia
Pacific factors, 159 could not be applied equally well in antitrust
cases alleging wrongful non-disclosure. The harsh nature of
the proposed royalty-free license as a remedy for (allegedly)
wrongful non-disclosure strikes us as out of line with the
nature of the offense. In particular, the royalty-free license
remedy does not set damages equal to the difference between
the actual world and the but-for world.
6. "Non-Discriminatory" Terms
The common requirement that the patent holder agree to
license its patent on "non-discriminatory" terms is not likely to
be controversial in the context of cash-only single-patent
licenses. That is, if the patent holder seeks, for example, a 1%
royalty for the one patent that is implicated by the standard,
its terms are "non-discriminatory" if every licensee is asked to
pay the same 1% royalty.
But even here there may be problems. Suppose, for
example, that both the patent and the standard read on a

156.

See FTC Rambus Compl., supra note 86.

157. In essence, it amounts to a confiscation of the patent holder's rights, in
favor of the users of the standard.
158. Indeed, the patent statute requires that damages be set at a level
"adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer." 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2001).
159.

See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F.

Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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variety of different products (e.g., multiple generations of
computer chips). The patent holder may elect to seek different
royalties for different products: For example, it may seek a 1%
royalty on older-generation chips and a 2% royalty on newergeneration chips. If it offers these same terms to all firms,
knowing that they will apply differently to different firms
depending on their product mix, this may be discriminatory.
On the one hand, firms that predominantly sell newergeneration chips will complain that they are being
discriminated against, because they must pay 2% while firms
selling older-generation chips only pay 1%. The terms change
the competitive position of the newer chips vis-A-vis older chips,
making newer chips relatively more expensive than older chips
and shifting demand away from newer chips toward older
chips. On the other hand, the patent holder can truthfully
point out (1) that its patent is more valuable to makers of
newer-generation chips, so that the royalty terms should reflect
that difference in value, and (2) by offering the same terms to
all potential licensees, it did not "discriminate" in favor of or
against any particular firm.
More significantly, the "non-discriminatory" requirement is
likely to be controversial in the context of the practice of
portfolio licensing, whereby the firm does not license its patents
individually, but instead grants a license for its entire portfolio
of patents. 160 It is also likely to be controversial where some
users of the standard already have portfolio licenses from the
patent holder.
Suppose, for example, that a firm like IBM, which has tens
of thousands of patents, 161 has a patent that is implicated by a
newly-adopted standard. IBM already has many preexisting
licenses with many firms. 162 Many of those licenses are
portfolio licenses and thus already include a license to use the
patent at issue. Those licensees would naturally contend that
they do not need to take another license for the same patent,
merely because the patent has now been implicated by a
standard.
But other firms that do not yet have licenses may argue
that they are being asked to pay a disproportionately high price

160. See Grindley & Teece, supra note 68, at 9, 33.
161.

See supra note 114.

162. We know this because of our discussions with IBM licensing
executives.
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(relative to the price paid by IBM's other licensees) for access to
the patent. For example, suppose that IBM offers a portfoliowide license to its thousands of patents for a 5% royalty, but
asks a 1% royalty for a single-patent license. 163 Users of the
standard, who need the single patent implicating the standard
but who do not need access to IBM's thousands of other
patents, will, not surprisingly, argue that they are being
charged a price that is out of proportion to the price paid by
others-and thus that they are being discriminated against.
This issue has already arisen in connection with various
patent pools.

164

For example, patent pools may seek to license

the pooled patents on a "bundled" basis, with a single royalty
rate for the use of all of the patents in the pool. For a number
of legitimate reasons, the patent pools administrator may
prefer not to offer the pooled patents on an a la carte basis, that
is, setting separate royalty rates for each patent and allowing
licensees to take licenses only for those patents that they elect
to license. 165 But firms that (because of their existing cross163.

IBM's current policy reads,
The following practice applies to the extent IBM has committed to
provide patent licenses as required by a Standards Organization:
Upon written request, IBM is willing to grant nonexclusive licenses
under its patents (to the extent required for the practice or
implementation of standards), on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms and conditions, to those who respect IBM's intellectualproperty
rights.
IBM, IBM Standards, Practices, available at http://www.ibm.com/ibm/
licensing/standards/practices.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (emphases
added). It further states, "The royalty rates are 1% of the selling price for each
patent used, up to a maximum of 5% of the selling price, for each licensed
product." See id.
164. For an extensive discussion of patent pools and the antitrust issues
they raise, see HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 1, § 34, at 34-1 to 34-34 (Supp.
2003).
165. From an economic and organizational behavior perspective, one
concern is that, if the managers of the patent pool were to grant such licenses,
they would have to monitor the subsequent conduct of the licensee to make
sure that the licensee was not using the unlicensed patents as well as the
licensed ones. Such monitoring can be costly, because it may involve a
detailed patent infringement-style evaluation of the licensee's product.
One of the reasons that the patent pool is willing to license is to avoid
incurring the ongoing costs of such investigations.
Another concern is that it may be more difficult for the various owners of
the pooled patents to agree on the appropriate royalty rates for such a la carte
licenses than it is to agree on both (a) an overall rate for the pooled patents,
and (b) a division of the royalty income among the patent holders.
Moreover, if all of the patents in the pool are "blocking," that is, it is
necessary to have a license to each of the patents in the pool in order to make
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licenses) already have a license to some, but not all, of the
patents in the pool contend that they should not have to pay
the same royalties as others who do not have such crosslicenses. 166 This raises the difficult question of how much
"credit" against the "pooled" rate should be allowed for the
existing in-licenses.
The "non-discriminatory" issue is also likely to be
controversial in the context of cross-licenses, in which one firm
out-licenses its patents to another firm in exchange for inlicenses to the other firm's patents. 67 As one of us has
discussed extensively elsewhere, cross-licenses can be royaltyfree, or they can involve some "balancing payment" that reflects
168
the difference in the value of the firms' patent portfolios.
Firms that are being asked to pay a higher cash royalty than
other firms (especially when the other firms have a royalty-free
license) may well disagree as to whether their out-licensed
patent portfolio is being valued in a "non-discriminatory"
fashion vis-A-vis other firms' portfolios.
Both the portfolio license and the cross-license issue
discussed above reflect the complications that arise when one
moves away from the simple "one patent, one standard, one
license" paradigm, into the more realistic world in which firms
have numerous patents and licenses cover more than one
patent.
Another concern involves the question of how one
determines whether or not license terms are "nondiscriminatory." License terms are often extremely confidential
business information (for both the licensor and the licensee).
Establishing whether license terms are "non-discriminatory"
inherently involves comparing the rates charged to one licensee
to the rates charged to other licensees. This leads to an
and sell a commercially viable product, then a la carte licensing makes no
economic sense, since a firm that took a license to some but not all of the

patents in the pool would be unable to make a commercially viable product
without licenses to the other blocking patents. (There are two main caveats
here. First, some firms may already have a license to some, but not all, of the
necessary patents. Second, firms may disagree about whether particular

patents in the pool are or are not "blocking.")
166. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Company for FTCIDOJ Hearings on
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, 4-6, at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020417jeffretfromm.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003) (statement of Jeffrey Fromm).

167.

For a general discussion of cross-licensing in high-tech industries, see

Grindley & Teece, supra note 68.

168.

Id. at 9, 18-19, 33.
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inherent conflict between maintaining confidentiality and
demonstrating that the terms are "non-discriminatory." This
conflict is even more pronounced when the other license terms
(e.g., the scope of the license or the royalty base) are different
across different licensees.

D. PENDING PATENT APPLICATIONS
Pending patent applications present a number of
complications not present in the context of issued patents.
First, as noted above, until recently the PTO kept pending
patent applications confidential. 169 The public policy rationales
for that confidentiality are well recognized. 170
Research
projects are often multi-faceted, and the results of that
research are developed over time. Some inventions may be
fully developed and ready to patent before other inventions that
flow from the same research. Other things being equal, a firm
with an invention wants to apply for a patent as quickly as
possible in order to preserve its priority date.' 7' But if its
application is immediately made public, others can see the
disclosure and rush in to file patent applications that "flank"
the initial application. This sort of "patent flooding" can
deprive the initial inventor of the fruits of its invention.
Allowing the patent applicant a "grace period" of confidentiality
before the patent application is thrown open gives the inventor
the opportunity to finish any remaining research and prepare
applications in an orderly fashion.
Moreover, the quid pro quo of patent law is that the
government grants the inventor the right to exclude others
from using the patented invention for a period of years in
exchange for the inventor's public disclosure of the invention.172

169, This was changed by 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2000).
170. For an economic analysis of the pros and cons of confidentiality and
disclosure, see REIKO AOKI & YOSSI SPIEGEL, PRE-GRANT PATENT
PUBLICATION, R&D, AND WELFARE, (May 16, 2001) (unpublished manuscript,
at http://www.tau.ac.il/-spiegel/papers/reiko.pdf); DANIEL K.N. JOHNSON &
DAVID POPP, FORCED OUT OF THE CLOSET: THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN
INVENTORS PROTECTION ACT ON THE TIMING OF PATENT DISCLOSURE, (July
2001) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8374, 2001, at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8374.pdf).
171. Even under a first-to-invent system, the priority date for evaluating
prior art is the filing date. As such, the innovating firm has an incentive to
file as early as possible, so as to prevent later publications from being
considered as "prior art."
172. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2000).
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If the PTO chooses not to grant the patent, the inventor does
not get the right to exclude others, but retains the opportunity
to try to keep its invention a trade secret. Mandatory
disclosure to the SSO precludes this opportunity.
Though the confidentiality issue is now less significant
than it used to be (because the change in the law now means
that many, but not all, pending applications are "thrown open"
for public inspection eighteen months after filing), the issue is
still significant (1) for those applications which are not thrown
open and (2) during the eighteen-month period for those
applications that are thrown open.
Second, any interested party (or the SSO itself) can search
for issued patents that are potentially relevant to a proposed
standard. 173 But only the applicant and the PTO are aware of
not-yet-disclosed,
thus
confidential,
pending
patent
applications. Therefore, to the extent that the SSO believes
that early disclosure (during the eighteen month confidentiality
period) is needed, it inherently has to rely on the patent
applicant to disclose the existence of the application.
Third, and most significantly, while the application is
pending, the applicant cannot know (1) whether any patent will
ultimately issue from a given application or (2) what the scope
of any (ultimately) granted patent may be.' 74 It is widely
recognized that the scope of patent claims is often narrowed
(sometimes drastically) during the patent prosecution process.
As such, it is often very difficult to reach a conclusion about
whether a patent application will ultimately mature into a
patent that reads on the proposed standard. And it is virtually
impossible to set "reasonable" ex ante licensing terms for the
patent if and when it issues.
As with issued patents, there is a continuum of possible
disclosure rules, ranging from no disclosure obligation, to an
obligation to disclose the existence (but not the content) of the
application, 175 to an obligation to disclose the contents of the
173. The advent of computerized patent databases, such as the official
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) database, at
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) and the
ThompsonlDelphion database, at http://www.delphion.com (last visited Mar.
10, 2003), among many others, has made it significantly easier to conduct such
searches.
174. By definition, these issues have already been resolved for issued
patents.
175. At least one major SSO, the IEEE, seems to propose such a policy:
"Given the confidentiality of the information [in pending applications], it is
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initial application, to a continuing obligation to inform the SSO
of any change in the status of the pending application. As
noted above, of the SSOs surveyed by Professor Lemley, only
four required disclosure of all pending patent applications,
while one required disclosure of published applications, and one
76
required disclosure only from the proponent of the standard.
Again, given the variety of policies that have been adopted by
different SSOs, there is no reason why a "one size fits all" policy
is appropriate.
1. Non-Disclosure Does Not Equal Lack of Knowledge
Even if the patent holder (or applicant) does not disclose
the existence of its patent (or application) to the SSO, some or
all of the other SSO participants may be aware of the existence
of the patent (or application), whether as a result of their own
investigations or as a consequence of disclosures in other
contexts. If so, the patent holder's "failure" to disclose would
appear to be relatively innocuous.
For example, if the other SSO members are aware that a
firm has a patent that it has not disclosed to the SSO, and the
SSO elects to adopt the standard anyway, that action implies
that they are not concerned about the patent issue. The SSO
may adopt the standard because they believe that the patent
either does not read on the standard or that the patent will not
be enforced (possibly because of validity concerns). Similarly, if
aware that a firm has a pending patent application, but the
SSO elects to adopt the standard anyway, this again implies
that they are not concerned about the patent issue, possibly
because they believe that no patent will ultimately issue (or
that the scope of any issued patent will not read on the
standard).
For example, in the Unocal case discussed in Part I.B
above, by disclosing the results of its research to Auto/Oil,
Unocal presumably put other firms on notice that Unocal had
conducted its own research, and those firms should have
reasonably inferred that Unocal would have applied for a
recognized that only a very limited amount of information can be expected to
be disclosed: i.e., that a patent application has been filed in a subject area."
Public Comments filed by the IEEE Standards Association in connection with
the FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and
Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
intelpropertycomments/index.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
176. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 1905.
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patent on its innovation. Indeed, several other oil companies
filed for patents for their own formulations of reformulated
gasoline and diesel fuel that complied with the CARB
regulations and did not disclose those patent applications to
others.'7 7 If the existence of a patent application had been an
issue, the obvious solution would have been for CARB to ask
Unocal whether it had any potentially relevant patents or
17 8
pending patent applications. CARB did not do so.
The Rambus case provides another example. 179 Rambus
did not disclose to the standards-setting organization, a JEDEC
committee, that it had pending U.S. patent applications.18 0 But
Rambus had filed European counterparts to its U.S.
applications, and under European patent law the European
applications had been thrown open eighteen months after
filing.
One European-based JEDEC member explicitly
informed other JEDEC members of the existence of Rambus's
European application, which contained a cross-reference to the
existence of the counterpart (and confidential) U.S.
application.18 1 Since the European application was open for
public inspection, one presumes that, had the other JEDEC
members been concerned about the issue, they could have
obtained and examined the European counterpart.
Moreover, Rambus had entered into limited-field-of-use
licenses with many of the JEDEC members for its proprietary
177.

See Unocal, Unocal Patent Issues Timeline, at http://www.unocal.com/

rfgpatentlrfgtime.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
178.

Deposition testimony in Unocal case (on file with authors).

179.

David Teece testified as Rambus's damages expert in the patent

infringement case brought by Rambus against Infineon. Rambus, Inc. v.
Infineon Technologies AG, 155 F. Supp. 2d 668 (E.D. Va. 2001), rev'd and
remanded, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

The discussion in this Article is based on publicly available information
(including the transcript of that trial), and does not reflect any confidential or
proprietary information.

Some of the relevant factual background can be

found in the FTC's administrative complaint against Rambus. FTC Rambus
Compl., supra note 86. The views expressed in this Article are those of the
authors, and do not necessarily reflect Rambus's position.

180. We do not address here the question whether Rambus had any duty to
disclose its pending applications to the JEDEC committee, or the related
question whether the (acknowledged) "failure" to disclose was wrongful. That
is a hotly-contested topic, and to address the issue fully would take more space

than is appropriate here. We note, however, that the Federal Circuit has
ruled that Rambus did not commit fraud on JEDEC by not disclosing its
pending patent applications. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318
F.3d 1081, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
181. See FTC Rambus Compl., supra note 86,

77.
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technology, and thus the Rambus licensees were aware of the
likelihood that Rambus had pending patent applications.' 82
These facts suggest that at least some other JEDEC members
were aware of the existence of Rambus's U.S. patent
applications and of the possibility that Rambus's patent
183
applications might read on the proposed standard.
Furthermore, JEDEC meeting minutes indicate that at least
some other firms apparently believed at the time that
Rambus's patent applications were "stuck" in the PTO and
184
would not ultimately issue (or would be limited by prior art).
The fact that the JEDEC committee adopted the standard
despite this knowledge suggests that the other JEDEC
members were not concerned about Rambus's pending patent
applications either because they believed that the patents
would not issue, because they felt that the Rambus technology
was sufficiently superior to the available alternatives, or
because they believed that they would be able to obtain licenses
from Rambus.
Obviously, there are intermediate cases, in which some but

182. We are aware, from discussions with Rambus executives, that, in at
least one Rambus license signed in 1995, the licensee (Hynix) agreed to pay
Rambus royalties on a relatively broad range of DRAM types, not merely
Rambus's proprietary RDRAMs.
183. In its Complaint, the FTC alleged that it was only after attending
JEDEC meetings that Rambus submitted additional patent claims to the PTO
that (allegedly) expanded the scope of the patent to cover the proposed
standard. FTC Rambus Compl., supra note 86, 1$ 48, 54, 61, 64, 68.
Under U.S. patent law, a patent applicant is allowed to amend the patent
claims and to add additional claims while still retaining the priority date of
the original patent application, so long as the new claims do not introduce any
"new matter" into the application. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2000); Kingsdown Med.
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Rambus contended, and the PTO examiner (by issuing the patent)
apparently agreed, that the ultimately-issued patent claims involved nothing
more than the invention that was disclosed in its initial patent filing, which
Rambus submitted over a year before it joined JEDEC and several years
before the meetings at issue. See FTC Rambus Compl., supra note 86,
34,
37.g, 37.i, 38.
Even if Rambus had disclosed the existence of its U.S. application, it is by
no means clear that the other JEDEC members would have believed that the
U.S. application read on the proposed standards. Other JEDEC members
were aware of the European counterpart application, and presumably
examined it. Id. 77. If they believed that the Rambus application would not
apply to the products being standardized by JEDEC, then presumably they
would not have acted differently than they in fact did.
184. See Committee Meeting Minutes of JEDEC Solid State Technology
Association (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with author).
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not all SSO participants are aware of the existence of a
potentially relevant patent or patent application. Our main
point here is that it is a mistake to confuse the lack of
disclosure with the proposition that other SSO participants
were unaware of the existence of the patent or patent
application. What should matter is what is known by the SSO,
not how the knowledge was acquired.
2. Public Policy Regarding Disclosure of Pending Patent
Applications
It might be argued that Congress's recent revision of the
patent statute, that throws open most pending patent
applications eighteen months after initial filing (which we will
refer to below as "early disclosure"), is likely to render the
disclosure issue largely moot in the context of standardssetting. Estimates suggest that 75-85% of applications will be
thrown open, putting participants in the SSO in a position to
search pending applications and ending reliance on the
applicant's disclosure.' 85 Alternatively, it might be argued that
Congress's decision represents a preference for openness, so
that there should be a presumption that SSO rules should
require disclosure. A closer examination casts doubt on both
suggestions.
Addressing the second suggestion first, it appears that
Congress amended the statute to bring U.S. patent law into
closer conformity with the patent laws of other countries,
notably European countries and Japan, which have long had a
policy of early disclosure. 86 In the debates leading up to the
adoption of the new statute, a number of scholars investigated
whether the change was desirable from a public policy
perspective. The general conclusion was that early disclosure,
by reducing the competitive advantage that innovators could
gain from their innovations, ran substantial risks of reducing
the returns to innovation, reducing the incentive to innovate
and thereby reducing the rate of innovation and the resulting
economic growth. In other words, as a stand-alone policy,
mandatory early disclosure does not appear to be desirable
from an overall social welfare standpoint.
We believe that Congress's enactment of early disclosure
legislation, in light of the contemporary evidence of the
185. See Johnson & Popp, supra note 170, at 33.
186. See the articles cited in note 170 supra,and sources cited therein.
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detrimental effects of early disclosure, can best be interpreted
as Congress's recognition of the U.S.'s obligation (under
international treaties) to modify U.S. patent law to harmonize
it with the patent law of other countries, and of the overall
benefits of such harmonization, rather than as an endorsement
of early disclosure per se. In fact, the form of the statute
reflects Congress's skepticism of early disclosure.
Early
disclosure does not apply to certain types of patent
applications; in particular, the application will not be disclosed
if the applicant commits not to file foreign patent applications
for the invention.18 7 This exception suggests that Congress
made the minimum disclosure change necessary to harmonize
U.S. patent law with foreign patent law. Where the issue of
harmonization did not arise-as it does not with applications
filed only in the United States-Congress chose not to adopt
early disclosure, but to retain the earlier no-disclosure policy
instead.18 8 This clearly casts doubt on any suggestion that
Congress favors early disclosure as a general policy matter. On
the contrary, the "carve-outs" in the statute suggest that
Congress preferred a no-disclosure regime, but felt constrained
by the United States' treaty obligations.
The fact that some applicants can opt out of early
disclosure (albeit at some economic cost, such as foregoing the
opportunity to file for foreign patent protection) in turn
suggests that non-disclosure of at least some pending
applications is likely to persist into the foreseeable future.
Hence, SSOs will still have to come to terms with the issue of
disclosure rules for pending patent applications. We believe,
however, that Congress's reluctance to adopt a widespread
early disclosure regime suggests that the public policy
rationales favoring secrecy of pending applications are still
significant.

E. THE NEED FOR CLARITY
Regardless of what search, disclosure, and licensing rules
the SSO adopts, from a public policy standpoint it is important
that the rules be (1) clearly stated, (2) clearly communicated to
participants, and (3) clearly enforced in an even-handed
manner. It is also important (4) that the consequences of a
participant's failure to comply with the rules be explicitly laid
187. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
188. Id.
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out.
Some SSOs have no explicit policies, believing (falsely) that
"everyone knows" the appropriate policies. 8 9
The wide
divergence in actual policies noted in Professor Lemley's survey
undercuts the credibility of this claim. 190
Other SSOs have ambiguous policies. For example, they
may not make it clear whether the disclosure policy applies to
pending patent applications as well as issued patents.' 9 1 More
commonly, policies can fail to indicate whether a duty to search
for potentially relevant patents exists; or, if such a duty exists,
the extent of the duty's scope. For example, is a "good faith"
investigation enough, or is something more required? Such
policies also fail to provide whether a search and/or disclosure
obligation applies to the firm's representative to the SSO or
instead reaches to the entire firm.
Moreover, regardless of what the rules say on paper, there
is a significant question whether the SSO applies those rules in
practice in an even-handed manner that is consistent with the
written rules. For example, suppose that on paper the SSO has
a strong policy requiring participants to search for and disclose
all potentially relevant patents and patent applications. Given
the sheer number of existing patents and new patent
applications in many technological fields, if such a policy were
interpreted literally, one would expect that the SSO would be
deluged with hundreds or thousands of disclosures.
The limited amount of available evidence suggests that, in
practice, disclosure is in fact much more limited.
SSO
representatives are apparently disclosing only a tiny fraction of
their firms' potentially relevant patents. 92 To be sure, the
representatives may be doing so on technological grounds,
disclosing only the patents that they believe are clearly
189. Professor Lemley reports that, of the forty-three SSOs he studied,
"four had no policy at all" and "two had statements on their website about IP
rights but no official policy." Lemley, supra note 17, at 1904.
190. Professor Lemley notes that "[tihe fact that different SSOs have
different rules governing IP rights (or no rules at all) means that it is very
difficult for IP owners to know ex ante what rules will govern their rights."
Lemley, supra note 17, at 1906-07.
191. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 1904 ("There was rarely discussion of
the problem of pending patent applications.").
192. See Committee Meeting Minutes of JEDEC Solid State Technology
Association, RAM Devices Subcommittee (May 24, 1995) (on file with author).
We have also had several discussions with various SSO representatives to
obtain this information.

1972

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1913

relevant to the standard under consideration. But this limited
disclosure, provides no assurance that the patent holder will
not subsequently assert an undisclosed patent against those
practicing the standard. A more realistic interpretation is that
the representatives simply are not aware of the full scope of
their firms' patent portfolios.
Similarly, even when the SSO's written policies require
that patent holders publicly announce the royalty rates that
they will seek on their patents that are implicated by proposed
standards before the standard's adoption, such policies appear
to be frequently ignored. 193 If a written rule is "honored in the
breach" by many, if not most, SSO participants, then it is
clearly objectionable to argue that the rule should nonetheless
be interpreted at face value when subsequent legal disputes
arise.
Lack of clarity in the rules-both as written and as
applied-clearly is something that SSOs can and should
address. As the Federal Circuit noted in the Rambus case,
"Just as lack of compliance with a well-defined patent policy
would chill participation in open standard-setting bodies, afterthe-fact morphing of a vague, loosely defined policy to capture
actions not within the actual scope of that policy likewise would
chill participation in open standard-setting bodies." 194 But
again there should be no presumption that, because the rules
are cloudy, the appropriate solution is to err on the side of
requiring disclosure and penalizing non-disclosure. On the
contrary, the fact that many, if not most, SSOs impose no duty
to search, and merely expect the individual representative to
disclose any potentially relevant patents of which she
193. For example, Professor Mueller cites a policy of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) to the effect that the IETF requires patent
holders to agree to license their implicated patents on "openly-specified...
terms." Mueller, supra note 27, at 906 n.55. Yet an examination of the letters
from various patent holders who have agreed to license their necessary
implicated patents indicates that the claimed obligation that the terms be
'openly specified" is almost entirely ignored in practice. See the letters posted
at the IETF Page of Intellectual Property Rights Notices, at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). Virtually all of the
letters merely indicate that the patent holder agrees to license on "reasonable,
non-discriminatory terms," without specifying what the royalty rate will be.
The "exception that proves the rule" is when the patent holder is willing to
license on a royalty-free basis. Mueller, supra note 27, at 906 n.55; see also id.
(listing examples of patent letters).
194. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 n.10
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
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individually is aware, suggests that the "default" rule should
err in the other direction.
F. SANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
A significant question that appears to have received almost
no attention is: what remedies and/or sanctions (if any) does
the SSO have when its members fail to comply with the SSO's
search, disclosure, and licensing rules?
Voluntary SSOs have to be concerned that, if they impose
onerous rules, firms may elect not to participate. 95 This
"participation constraint" limits the sanctions that SSOs can
impose on firms for failure to comply with the SSO's rules. The
typical remedy for non-disclosure imposed by the SSO is quite
limited: the SSO will elect not to issue the proposed standard,
and will "decertify" or withdraw the standard if it is
subsequently discovered that there is a patent that reads on
the standard, and the patent holder is not willing to agree to
license its patent on "reasonable and non-discriminatory"
196
terms.
Taking the latter point first, this raises the obvious
question: does a willingness to license on "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" terms to all interested parties effectively
"purge" any failure to disclose earlier? On the face of it, the
answer would appear to be "yes." If the patent holder is willing
to license on reasonable terms, there is no reason to believe
that the SSO will withdraw the standard, and no reason to
believe that the SSO would have acted any differently had it
known of the existence of the patent before the standard's
adoption. The major caveat here involves the distinction drawn
above between ex post and ex ante "reasonableness." 97
The power of the "threat" to withdraw the standard as a
sanction for non-disclosure varies across different standards,
depending on how easy it is for industry participants to switch
to a different standard. In other words, the threat's power
depends on the degree of "lock-in" involved. In some cases,
once firms in the industry gear up to make and sell a
standardized product, it may be extremely difficult to change to
195. See supra discussion Part IV.A.3.
196. As noted, a relatively small number of SSOs have policies preventing
the adoption, or maintenance, of any standard on which there is a patent
unless the patent holder is willing to license its patent royalty-free. See supra
Parts IV.A and IV.C.
197. See supra Part IV.C.3.
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another, unpatented alternative. 98 Merely "withdrawing" a
standard as a formal standard may have little effect on
industry behavior or the ability of the patent holder to induce
others to pay royalties. Moreover, withdrawing a standard on a
going-forward basis will not undo the fact that industry
participants previously used the standard, thereby infringing
the patent and exposing themselves to liability for damages for
past infringement.
On a more conceptual level, withdrawing the standard
imposes costs on other firms, not just on the firm that failed to
comply with the SSO's rules. Ideally, one would want to find a
sanction for non-compliance that penalized only the offending
firm, not others.
On the face of it, the fact that SSOs may have relatively
weak sanctions for non-compliance might be thought to justify
the antitrust authorities in imposing stronger sanctions under
the antitrust laws. Such a policy is seriously questionable, for
several reasons.
First, if sanctions for non-compliance are relatively weak,
the participants in the SSO, and other non-participants who
make and use the standardized products, presumably are, or
should be, aware of that fact. They presumably are thus aware
that their protection against non-compliance is weak, and they
can make their plans accordingly. Second, as noted above, 99
imposing strict sanctions for non-compliance would run the risk
that firms would choose not to participate in the SSO in the
first place.
In other words, firms "know what they are getting into"
when the sanctions for non-compliance are clearly specified in
advance. In such situations, intervention by the antitrust
authorities to impose additionalsanctions for non-compliance,
beyond the ones imposed by the SSO itself, essentially amounts
to changing the "ground rules" ex post. We see no reason why,
if an SSO chooses to impose weak sanctions for non-compliance,
and if those sanctions are clearly laid out in advance, the
antitrust authorities should "fix" the situation by imposing
additional sanctions beyond those imposed by the SSO.
198. The FTC has argued that the Rambus case, involving semiconductor
manufacturers and JEDEC SDRAM standards, involves such a "lock-in" to the
standard. See FTC Rambus Compl., supra note 86,
105-09. The extent to
which any such "lock-in" exists, or how significant it is in a dynamic industry
such as DRAMs, is a disputed factual question.
199. See supra Part IV.A.3.
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V. CAPTURING THE BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION
THROUGH SSO-RULE CLARITY
A. THE BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION AND THE NEED FOR
SPEED

It is widely recognized that standardization can yield
significant social benefits. 20 0 It is often less widely recognized
that factors that delay the standards-setting process can
impose significant adverse social costs. To generate the
greatest social benefits, the standards-setting process must be
both timely and efficient. This is especially true in fast-moving,
high-tech industries. It does little good to take twenty-four
months to set a standard when product life-cycles are eighteen
months. A delay in setting a standard often means that new
20 1
products get delayed, or markets do not develop.
1. The Social Costs of Delay
Public policies that slow the adoption of standards can
have very detrimental economic effects. By way of illustration,
suppose that the product life-cycle in the industry is three
years, and that some factor delays the adoption of a standard
for the next-generation product by six months. This delay
causes the loss of one-sixth (the three-year product life-cycle,
divided by the one-half-year delay) of the overall social gains
realized by moving to the next generation product. It is not
uncommon in many high-tech industries for new generation
products to represent a 50-100% improvement or more (in
terms of net consumer satisfaction) over the earlier product, as
anyone who recalls the early days of cellular telephones or
personal computers can appreciate. 20 2 If so, a six-month delay
200. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 17, at 1896-98.
201. Examples include digital audio tape (DAT), high-definition television,
and cellular telephone technology. For an extended discussion of these and
other examples, see GRINDLEY, supra note 5, at 99-130, 195-234, 235-72.
202. In the semiconductor industry, "Moore's Law" asserts that the number
of transistors per square inch of silicon in integrated circuits doubles every
twelve to eighteen months. For an extended discussion, see Ilkka Tuomi, The
Lives and Death of Moore's Law, at http://www.firstmonday.dk
issues/issue7_ll/tuomi/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2003). A recent study suggests
that, on a quality-adjusted basis, prices of desktop personal computers fell at a
compound annual rate of 27% over the 1976-99 period. Ernest R. Berndt et
al., Price and Quality of Desktop and Mobile Personal Computers: A Quarter
Century of History, 2, at http://www.nber.org/-confer/2000/si2000/berndt.pdf
(July 17, 2000).
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can result in losing 8-16% of the overall social value of the
product line as a whole.
2. Consortia, Organizational Structure, and Efficiency
Special-purpose SSOs, sometimes called consortia, are
often faster, and can be more focused and nimble, than more
"formal" SSOs in setting standards. 20 3 Participation in specialpurpose SSOs is often limited to key players whose agreement
is crucial to developing the standard. 20 4
With fewer
participants, it is often faster and easier to reach consensus.
Moreover, consortia are often less constrained by "due process"
considerations than formal SSO counterparts that have
formalized agendas and procedures. This in turn has led to a
major shift away from the use of "formal" SSOs, and the
proliferation of informal/voluntary SSOs and special-purpose
consortia.
The difference is especially apparent in the distinction
(discussed above 20 5) between voluntary standards and
regulations. Regulatory bodies are often constrained by due20 6
process considerations in ways that voluntary SSOs are not.
As such, the regulatory process can often be much more timeconsuming than private standards-setting.
The shift from more-formal SSOs to less-formal consortia
can potentially have an adverse effect on the openness and
transparency of decision making if consortia lack the types of
due process procedural safeguards that more-formal SSOs
have. In our view, however, the absence of complex procedural
rules should be seen as an advantage, not a disadvantage. So
long as the SSO's rules are clearly specified in advance, firms
can "know what they are getting into" and can decide whether
to participate and whether to rely on (or adopt) the SSO's
standard accordingly.

203. The authors have discussed this with participants at the FTC/DOJ
panel on standards setting and antitrust, and, in particular, with Carl Cargill,
Director of Corporate Standards, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Apr. 18, 2002).
204. For a discussion of the pros and cons of limited-membership SSOs, see
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 1, § 35.3, at 35-21.
205. See supra Part I.A.2.
206. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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B. EFFORTS To BLOCK OR DELAY THE ADOPTION OF A
STANDARD

This Article's premise so far has been that the patent
holder wants the SSO to adopt a standard that incorporates its
patent. But in some cases, a patent holder may want to
prevent-or if that is not possible, delay-the adoption of a
standard. For example, an incumbent firm may be concerned
that an SSO is developing a standard that will enable other
firms to compete more effectively with the incumbent. 20 7 If the
incumbent can prevent or delay the adoption of such a
competing standard, it may be able to protect its current
market position.
Further, if the incumbent firm holds a potentially relevant
patent, it may be able to manipulate the SSO's rules to prevent
or delay the adoption of a competing standard. Suppose, for
example, that the SSO rules prevent the SSO from adopting a
standard once a patent has been identified that potentially
reads on the standard, unless the patent holder is willing to
agree to license its patent on reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms. The incumbent firm need only
assert that it has a potentially relevant patent and refuse to
agree to license on RAND terms to block the standard's
adoption. By blocking the SSO standard, the incumbent
protects its market position.
Note that this tactic requires only that the incumbent
assert that it has a potentially relevant patent. It does not
require that the patent actually read on the proposed standard,
at least if the SSO is not willing to take a position on that
issue. Many SSOs are unwilling to do so, instead taking at face
value the assertions of the patent holder.
C. RESTRICTIONS ON PARTICIPATION

Above we discussed one sort of "participation constraint":
the concern that onerous rules will discourage participation in
the SSO by patent holders. But there is another, unrelated
"participation" concern: should any interested party be allowed

207. For example, Microsoft has been accused of trying to prevent or delay
the development of operating systems or middleware such as Java that would
undercut its market position. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.

Supp. 2d 9, 22-24, 32-37 (D.D.C. 1999); Franklin M. Fisher & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, U.S. v. Microsoft-An Economic Analysis, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 1,

19-23 (2001).
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to participate in the SSO, or are "closed" SSOs acceptable? 20 8
In this regard, it is important to draw a distinction
between participatingin setting a standard and practicingthat
standard. Unless the standard implicates a patent, anyone can
practice the standard, even those who did not participate in
setting it. Indeed, one concern that many SSOs have is that
non-participants can "free-ride" on the standardization efforts
of others. Operating an SSO involves costs; those costs have to
be recouped somehow, 20 9 and the SSO is often concerned about
how to do so. One way is to charge a significant fee, much
larger than the cost of reproduction, for copies of the standards
1
adopted by the SSO.2 0

Concerns about firms' ability to participate in setting the
standard are fundamentally different from concerns that firms
need to produce products that comport with the standard in
order to participate in the product market, i.e., in that the
ability to practice the standard is (in antitrust terms) an
"essential facility." As a general matter, unless the standard
involves patented technology that the SSO-member patent
holder is not willing to license to non-members on RAND
terms, 211 non-participants in the standards-setting process can
still practice the standard.
Instead, the inquiry turns to whether those excluded from
participating are disadvantaged either (1) in terms of setting
the standard or (2) in terms of access to the patented
technology incorporated in the standard. With respect to the
former issue, the non-participants' concern is that they may
disagree with the standard ultimately chosen. But in a world
where firms disagree about the best standard, that is likely to
be the case for some participants as well. The relevant issue is
whether the standards-setting process is systematically biased
208. For an extensive discussion of this issue, see HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 35.3.
209. See Patterson, supra note 76, at 2003-04.
210. Some SSOs charge significant fees (especially to non-members) for

copies of their standards. For example, ANSI promotes membership by
indicating that members "achieve up to three-times financial payback on
member dues via site licensing of electronic standards collections." American
National Standards Institute, The Benefits of ANSI Membership, at http:

//public.ansi.org/ansionline/Documents/Membership/why-buy-ansi.pdf
visited Mar. 10, 2003).
211.

(last

Issues arise if licenses are only available to SSO members, or if non-

members are charged higher royalties than members are charged. See
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 1, § 5.7, at 35-54.2. Even here, there is a
countervailing "free rider" issue.
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by excluding non-participants.
With respect to the latter (access to patented technology)
issue, if the patent holder agrees to license all interested
parties (whether SSO members or non-members) on RAND
terms, then non-members can obtain access to the standardized
technology on non-discriminatory terms, and the issue does not
arise. If, however, the SSO members agree only to license their
IP to each other (and not to non-members), or agree to charge
higher royalty rates to non-members, then the issue of
212
discrimination may become significant.
The example in the previous section suggests that SSOs
may legitimately want to limit participation in the standardssetting process by those whose interests would be served by
preventing or delaying the adoption of such a standard.
Unfortunately, it may be very difficult to determine whether
this is in fact the case. Ascertaining true motives can be
difficult, especially since large incumbent firms are likely to be
affected by proposed changes and, thus, presumably have a
strong interest in having their views considered.
And
accusations of misconduct are easy to make but difficult to
resolve. What one firm may see as "delay" or "obstructionist
behavior" on the part of another firm can often be defended as
"deliberate consideration of relevant factors."
Moreover, considerations of organizational efficiency
suggest that the standards-setting process is likely to work
more efficiently and more quickly with fewer participants,
especially if those participants have interests that are
reasonably well aligned with one another. One suspects that
this is the reason for the proliferation of special-purpose
standards consortia; they can limit participation to a small
number of key players, and are not constrained by the "due
process" and other procedural considerations that more formal

212. We stress "may" here because, to the extent that the SSO depends on
member contributions (e.g., membership dues) to fund its operations, it is
perfectly reasonable for the SSO to charge non-members (who do not pay dues)
a higher royalty rate for the SSO's IP than it charges to non-members.
Similarly, to the extent that SSO members have contractually agreed to a
mutual licensing policy (so that each member agrees, as part of the quid pro
quo membership agreement, that it will agree to out-license its patents to
other members in exchange for their agreement to do the same), there is no
reason why non-members (who have not agreed to be bound by such a
commitment) should get the benefit of the lower (member) royalty rates.
As such, it can often be a difficult factual issue to determine whether any
differential treatment of members and non-members is legitimate.
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SSOs must follow.
Efficiency considerations also suggest that there is no
necessary reason for a "one firm, one vote" rule in setting
standards. Some firms are much more likely to be affected by
which standard is selected than other firms are. Absent some
procedural safeguards (such as a supermajority voting
requirement), some firms may well elect not to participate.
Nonetheless, the choice of a standard clearly can affect nonparticipants. Affected individuals or firms naturally want to
"have a voice" in decisions that affect them.
Different SSOs can and do "compete" with one another via
the participation rules and procedures they adopt. These
include such factors as membership qualifications, voting rules
(e.g., one-firm-one-vote, one-attendee-one-vote, votes proportional to market share, and supermajority rules), procedures
(e.g., agenda setting, the role of committees, and opportunities
for comments), and the overall cost and speed of the standard
setting process. Our point here is that, again, there is no
reason why a "one size fits all" approach is appropriate.
However, we believe that one comment is in order. There
is a fundamental asymmetry between participants and nonparticipants. Non-participants cannot be bound by the rules of
a voluntary SSO. In particular, a non-participant can assert its
patents against those practicing the standard, without being
subject to search, disclosure, or licensing obligations.
If participants are bound by the SSO's rules, and (in
particular) to extend the benefits of such rules (in particular,
rules requiring licensing on RAND terms) to non-members,
then non-participants can remain free to assert their own
patents against participants as they see fit, while retaining the
ability to compel participants to grant licenses for their patents
on "reasonable and non-discriminatory" terms.
Such an
asymmetric situation provides an incentive for firms not to
participate in the standards-setting process. 2 13 This in turn
implies that it may well be rational for the SSO to implement
asymmetric rules aimed at counteracting this incentive.
One possible resolution to this asymmetry would involve
having a "two-tiered" membership in the SSO. "Full" members
would be able to fully participate in the standards-setting
213. This is especially likely if non-participants can argue that they should
be able to claim the benefits, under the legal theories of equitable estoppel or
third-party beneficiary, of disclosure policies for SSOs for which they are not
members.
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process, including proposing new standards, proposing changes,
and voting on proposed standards. "Observer" members would
be able to observe, and be informed of, the standard being set,
but would not otherwise be able to participate. The quid pro
quo would be that "full" members would have broader
disclosure and/or licensing obligations than "observer"
members would. The key idea here is that "observer" members
would have little or no ability to actively "manipulate" the
standards-setting process in their favor.
D. ADOPTION OF IMPLICATED STANDARDS

The analysis thus far has been based on the premise that
the SSO wants to avoid adopting a standard if there are
patents that read on the standard. It is worth considering the
converse situation, in which the SSO adopts a standard when it
knows (or has good reason to know) that there are potentially
relevant patent claims that may read on the products that
comply with the standard.
Such conduct need not be entirely intentional. An SSO
may be aware of the patent claims (or the existence of the
pending patent application), but may conclude that the patent
does not read on the proposed standard, or that the patent is
invalid, or that the patent application will not issue. The SSO
may, thus, adopt the standard despite its knowledge of the
patent or pending application. The patent holder (applicant)
clearly may disagree with the SSO's assessment of the prospect
that a patent will ultimately issue; such a discrepancy on the
merits is unsurprising.
Many SSOs have policies that, at least on paper, prevent
the SSO from adopting a standard when there is any doubt as
to whether a known patent reads on the proposed standard,
unless the patent holder has agreed to license its patent to all
potential users of the standard, whether royalty-free or on a
"reasonable and non-discriminatory" basis. However, the
extent to which such policies are honored in practice is an open
question.
The concern here is that ex post, once (1) the standard is
adopted, (2) firms are making products comporting with the
standard, and (3) the patent holder seeks payment for the use
of its patent, the accused infringers may argue that it is
inappropriate under the antitrust laws for a participating
patent holder to assert its patents against the infringing
standardized products. If this argument is accepted, the users
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of the standard can use the leverage of the antitrust law to
compel the patent holder to allow them to use the patent. If
the antitrust remedy is a compulsory license (whether royaltyfree or a license at a court-determined rate), then the other
SSO members have in effect been able to obtain a compulsory
license at a court-ordered rate (or for free), rather than having
to negotiate and pay for a license.
As noted above, we believe that SSOs tend to be biased in
favor of the users of standards and against the interests of
patent holders. 21 4 The prospect that SSOs may be able to use
the antitrust laws to compel compulsory licenses (especially if
such licenses are royalty-free) is likely to exacerbate this bias.
In particular, we believe that it makes no sense on public policy
grounds to allow SSO members effectively to "expropriate"
others' patented technology merely by adopting a standard
when they know (or have reason to know) of potential patent
issues.
The Rambus case provides a possible example. 2 15 Rambus
withdrew from JEDEC in June 1996, some three years prior to
JEDEC's adoption of standards for the next-generation of
dynamic random access memory (DRAM) (known as DDR

SDRAMs) in August

1999.216

In its withdrawal letter, Rambus

explicitly stated that it had both issued patents and pending
patent applications, and informed JEDEC that it intended to
enforce its patent rights against other firms. 21 7 To the extent
that other JEDEC members were aware of Rambus's patent
specification and/or claims (whether in its issued patents or its
pending patent applications), but chose to adopt a DDR
SDRAM standard (or later standards) incorporating Rambus's
technology despite that awareness, this clearly raises concerns.
E. ANTITRUST INTERVENTION AND CLARITY
As noted above, 2 18 we believe that clarity of the SSO's rules
is a key desideratum. Unfortunately, in our opinion, ex post
antitrust enforcement efforts are often likely to reduce clarity
and predictability, rather than enhance it.
Up to this point, this Article has tacitly assumed that
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part IV.D.1.
FTC Rambus Compl., supra note 86,
Id. TT 48, 56, 63-64, 67, 72, 82-85.
See supra Part IV.E.

27, 82-83.
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standards-setting activities can potentially raise antitrust
concerns. But in our experience the nature of those concerns,
and the legal basis for intervention, has rarely been articulated
21 9
clearly.
We believe that the typical context 220 involves the claim
that, by manipulating the standards-setting process (whether
"actively" in an effort to "capture" a standard, or "passively" by
improperly failing to disclose a relevant patent), the patent
holder has gained improper market power in the technology
market. Absent the need to comport with the standard (i.e.,
absent the "lock-in"), firms might (if feasible) find a way to
avoid infringing the patent, by adopting an alternative
technology. 221 But given that firms have a strong economic
incentive to comport with the standard, the patent holder may
be able ex post to extract a much higher price for the use of its
patented technology than it would have been able to do absent
the standard.
The antitrust concern here is not the proposition that the
standard enhances the patent holder's market power per se.
This is most readily seen in connection with patents held by
non-participants in the standards-setting process. Adoption of
a standard can confer a substantial windfall gain on nonparticipant patent holders, who (just like participant patent
holders) may be able to extract higher royalties for the use of
their patents than they would have been able to do absent the
standard. But we know of no one who suggests that such
conduct is an antitrust violation. Consequently, the "evil" that
the antitrust law seeks to address in these contexts is the

219. Is the concern one of a conspiratorial agreement under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, or monopolization or attempted monopolization under section 2
of the Sherman Act? If so, presumably the challenger must establish the other
elements of any such claims.
The distinction between an enforcement action by the FTC or DOJ and a
private antitrust action can be significant here. In particular, section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act gives the FTC the authority to intervene in the
context of "unfair methods of competition," but does not create a private right
of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994); 1 AM. BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS (FOURTH) 759-60 n.22 (1997). Despite
this, private litigants (such as Infineon in Rambus v. Infineon) have argued
that the FTC's In re Dell consent decree reflects a more general antitrust
policy regarding standards-setting activities.
220. Obviously, there are other antitrust claim contexts, such as the
"stuffing the ballot box" conduct in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496-97 (1988).
221. Cf HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 1, § 35.5b, at 35-41.
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manipulation that led to the enhanced value of the patent, not
the fact that a patent reads on a standard or the enhanced
value per se.
It is one thing for the antitrust authorities to adopt clearly
specified rules on an ex ante basis governing standards-setting
organizations and practices. For example, if the antitrust
authorities believe that the public interest will be best served
by requiring fully open participation, then they could announce
an ex ante rule (or ask Congress to pass a statute) requiring all
SSOs to be fully open to all interested parties. If the antitrust
authorities believe that the public interest would be best served
if all standards were "open," in the sense that they did not
implicate patent rights, then the antitrust authorities could
announce an ex ante rule (or ask Congress to pass
a statute)
222
requiring that standards be "open" in that sense.
But it is something quite different for the antitrust
authorities to use enforcement actions applying general
antitrust principles to penalize conduct on an ex post basis in
contexts where the rules are not clear, or, indeed, where the
rules are explicitly to the contrary. For example, many of the
public comments on the In Re Dell consent decree expressed
concern that the scope of that ruling was unclear. 223 Was it
intended to apply solely to cases (such as the situation
described by the FTC majority in Dell 224) where the SSO's
policies required the firm's representative to certify in writing
that his or her firm had no patents that read on the proposed
standard? Or did the prohibition extend to other cases? For
example, what is the appropriate antitrust rule (or policy)
222. We stress that we do not believe that either of these rules is desirable
as a general policy.
223. The Dell matter involved a consent decree, and, in theory, consent
decrees have no precedential effect. See 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
24,
327c. This does not mean, however, that interested parties were not
concerned about the general policy that underlay the FTC's reasoning in Dell,
as the number of public comments demonstrates. See In re Dell Computer
Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 623 (1996).
224. See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 623 (1996). It is our
understanding, based on conversations with knowledgeable individuals, that
Dell contended that the scope of the VESA certification obligation was limited
to the representatives' personal knowledge. However, Dell was willing to
enter into the consent decree rather than litigate this disputed issue. ThenCommissioner Azcuenaga's dissent in In Re Dell took the Commission
majority to task (in our opinion, correctly) for going beyond what the parties
had stipulated to in the consent decree when writing the majority opinion (in
particular, whether Dell's conduct was "intentional"). Id. at 639 (Azcuenaga,
Comm'r., dissenting).
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toward disclosure when the SSO's policies make it clear that it
imposes no obligation to search for potentially relevant patents
and that any disclosure obligation is limited to the personal
knowledge of the individual representative?
F. PROBLEMS WITH "ONE SIZE FITS ALL" POLICIES
It is common for commentators to suggest that the rules
"should" or "must" be one way or another. For example,
Mueller recently proposed that "[a]ny firm that participates in
creating an industry standard and thereafter obtains patent
rights in some aspect of the standard must, at a minimum,
disclose the existence of any patents or pending patent
applications that may be relevant to the standard."225
Such a proposal can be understood in one of two ways. The
first is as a mandatory rule, specifying what the rules should
be-whether as a general matter of public policy or as a
consequence of application of antitrust principles-allowing for
no deviation. The second is what is often termed a default rule,
to be thought of as the general proposition to be applied in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, but one that can be
226
changed by the SSO if it chooses to do so.
These two interpretations have fundamentally different
bases and policy implications. In our opinion, it is simply
unnecessary to adopt mandatory rules in this area. SSOs are
perfectly capable of adopting their own search, disclosure, and
licensing rules, and of adapting those rules to the needs of the
SSO participants. The results of Professor Lemley's survey
indicate that SSOs have a variety of different rules. 227 There is
no reason why a "one size fits all" mandatory-type approach is
228
appropriate.
225. Mueller, supra note 27, at 929 (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
226. For a discussion of the law and economics of default rules, see
generally, Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 PALGRAVE,
supra note 65, at 585-90.
227. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 1904-07.
228. Professor Lemley has expressed concern that the variety across SSO

rules does not appear to be indicative of any intentionally adopted policies. He
sees no indication that the SSOs explicitly considered the range of alternative

policies and intentionally chose the particular alternative that it did based on
any kind of cost-benefit analysis. As such, he suggests that the antitrust
authorities need not give deference to SSO policies in this area. See Lemley,
supra note 17, at 1954-57.
We agree that the existing policies often appear to be a matter of
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We find it is extremely telling that, at the recent FTC and
Department of Justice (DOJ) hearings on the intersection
between antitrust and intellectual property, both of the
comments from SSOs expressed the belief that the current
system worked reasonably well, and expressed concern that the
antitrust authorities might adopt a "one size fits all"
interventionist approach to standards issues. 229 We believe
that those comments, coupled with the results of Professor
Lemley's survey showing the wide diversity of policies across
SSOs, 230 strongly suggest that the antitrust authorities should
proceed cautiously in this area.
In particular, we are concerned that antitrust intervention
may reduce the clarity of the rules, thereby making
participation in SSOs more risky and reducing the willingness
of firms with valuable IP (and which therefore presumably
have much to contribute to selecting the appropriate standard)
to participate. If the SSO's rules are unclear, the obvious
public policy solution is to encourage SSOs to adopt clearer
rules on a going-forward basis.
Most significantly, we believe that intervention runs a
significant risk of slowing down the standards-setting process,
thus delaying the adoption of new standards and new products
made in accordance with those standards, to the detriment of
consumers and of society generally.
This is not, of course, to suggest that there will never be an
appropriate role for antitrust scrutiny of the standards-setting
actions of SSOs or their participants. There is no question but
that the activities of SSOs can affect non-participants, and one
historical accident and are not likely to reflect a well-thought-out or "optimal"
degree of diversity. But in our opinion this is all the more reason for the
antitrust authorities to tread warily in this area. This implies either that the

SSOs themselves did not believe that the issue was important enough to
carefully consider the range of alternative policies and to select the "best"
policy, or that the choice of search, disclosure, and licensing rules reflects a

degree of political compromise within the SSO. In either case, it is not likely
that the antitrust authorities are in a better position than the SSO itself to

strike a better balance of the competing interests of the various SSO
participants.
229. See IEEE Standards Association, Comments Regarding Competition
and Intellectual Property, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
intelpropertycomments/ieee.pdf (Apr. 17, 2002); Amy A. Marasco, StandardsSetting Practices:Competition, Innovation and Consumer Welfare, availableat

http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020418marasco.pdf (Apr. 18, 2002) (testimony
by Amy A. Marasco, Vice President and General Counsel, American National
Standards Institute).
230. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 1904-07.
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rationale for antitrust intervention is to protect the interests of
such non-participants from being adversely affected by
decisions in which they did not participate or could not exert
influence. And there are obvious examples of manipulation of
SSO rules/policies, such as the "stuffing the ballot box" example
of Allied Tube, 23 1 in which antitrust intervention may be the
only solution.
But we believe that the antitrust authorities are likely to
give too little weight to the fact that SSOs, as voluntary
organizations, must often walk a fine line between competing
interests. In our view, ex post intervention runs the serious
risk of failing to recognize the ex ante balancing of competing
interests.
CONCLUSION
Standards have come to play an increasingly significant
economic role in fostering the development and adoption of new
technology. Of particular importance in many fields are formal
standards adopted by voluntary SSOs. Since the source of new
technology is new innovation, and since Western societies have
chosen to use the patent system (along with trade secrecy and
copyright) as a major social incentive mechanism to encourage
innovation, SSOs must ipso facto come to grips with the issue
of how to deal with standards that involve patented
innovations. A recent survey by Professor Mark Lemley
indicates that SSOs have a variety of types of rules-notably
search, disclosure, and licensing rules-to address these issues,
and that SSOs vary widely in the stringency of the rules that
232
they adopt.
Private standards-setting by SSOs represents a classic
example of what organizational theorists term a "private
ordering." Such private orderings can be both a possible
substitute for, and a strong complement to, "public" orderings
such as those reflected in the antitrust laws and other statutes.
As such, private SSOs have the flexibility to experiment with
alternative procedures and rules, and to adapt those rules and
procedures to particular circumstances in a way that a "one
size fits all" approach can never achieve.
Consequently, we believe that though there clearly is a
legitimate role for antitrust policy in connection with standards
231. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
232. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 1904-07.
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setting, the antitrust authorities should tread warily in
intervening in this area. Intervention runs the risk of reducing
the clarity and predictability of rules, thereby increasing
uncertainty and making participation in SSOs by firms with
valuable intellectual property more risky and, therefore, less
likely. As such, intervention runs the risk of delaying the
adoption of standards, thereby reducing the economic gains
from standardization and reducing social welfare generally.
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APPENDIX
ON THE PRIVATE AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF
STANDARDS INVOLVING PATENTS

For simplicity and analytic convenience, we consider the
case in which the characteristics of the product are fixed, and
the issue is whether a standards-setting organization (SSO)
should adopt (as a standard) either a patented process (denoted
P) of making the product or an alternative unpatented process
(denoted U).
We assume throughout that the SSO must select either P
or U as a standard, and that the adoption of a standard makes
it much more expensive for firms to subsequently switch to the
alternative.
Obviously, if the patented alternative P costs more than
the unpatented alternative U, it would make no sense for the
SSO to adopt P as the standard. 233 As such, we restrict our
233. In practice, the SSO might not know whether P is (or will turn out to
be) lower cost than U at the time that the SSO must adopt the standard. For
example, U might be the existing technology, while P might be a new,
unproven but promising technology that has the prospect (but not the
certainty) of lowering costs.
Analytically, if the SSO must make a once-and-for-all irrevocable decision
to adopt either P or U, the appropriate approach is straightforward: the SSO
should calculate the ex ante expected costs of using P and U (given the best
available information at the time the decision is made), and choose the
alternative with the lower expected cost. However, if the SSO can delay
adoption of the standard until more information about cost is known, or if
adopting a standard does not rule out future use of the rejected alternative,
the analytic framework is more complicated, involving a "real options"
approach. For a discussion of the concept of "real options" and its economic
significance, see TOM COPELAND & VLADIMIR ANTIKAROV, REAL OPTIONS: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (2001).

Another, related but conceptually distinct issue involves the appropriate
choice of standards in contexts where technology is changing over time. The
concern is that, by adopting a particular technology or feature as the standard,
it may be more difficult to switch to another technology/feature that
subsequently becomes feasible, less costly or more desirable. This "lock-in"
feature of standards is well recognized.
It might be argued that that standardization is undesirable, on the
grounds that adopting any given technology as a standard makes it more
costly and/or difficult for the industry to adapt to new technologies as they
develop. In our opinion, such a conclusion is unwarranted. While it is clearly
true that premature standardization can impose significant social costs (as the
history of efforts to develop a high-definition television standard demonstrate),
the difficulty is knowing in advance when standardization is "premature."
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attention to the case where P is a lower cost alternative than U,
ignoring for now the issue of royalties. By "lower cost" we
mean that fewer real economic resources (e.g., labor, materials,
capital, etc.) are used in producing the good using P than using
U. Thus, choosing P rather than U "frees up" those resources
for use elsewhere in the economy.
We denote by Cp the cost (per unit) of making the product
using the patented alternative P, and by C, the cost (per unit)
of making the product using the unpatented alternative U.
(For simplicity, we ignore fixed costs, or assume that the fixed
costs are the same regardless of which alternative is chosen.)
Then the per-unit cost savings from adopting the patented
alternative P are S = C, - CP. In light of the above discussion,
we assume S > 0.
Assume for now that, prior to the adoption of the standard,
the patent holder commits itself to demanding per-unit
royalties 234 of Rp for the use of its patented technology.
Suppose further that, once the standard is adopted,
competition among users of the standard (i.e., manufacturers of
the product) will drive the price of the product down to the
marginal cost of production. 235 Thus if the unpatented
alternative is adopted, the price will equal C, while if the
patented alternative is adopted, the price will equal the sum of
the manufacturing cost-per-unit Cp and the per-unit royalty R.
With a downward-sloping demand curve D with Q = D(P),
the market-clearing price if the unpatented alternative is
adopted will be Qu = D(Cu), while the market clearing price if
the patented alternative is adopted will be Qp = D(C,+ R,).
Using 20/20 hindsight provides little useful policy guidance.
And the
alternative is often to forego the benefits of standardization altogether, a
"cure" that is likely to be worse than the "disease."
234. The case where the patent holder asks for running royalties expressed
as a percentage of the selling price (rather than on a flat per-unit basis) is
similar. If the patent holder seeks a fully-paid-up-lump-sum (FPULS) license
rather than running royalties, the economic analysis is significantly different.
Fundamentally, with running royalties, the royalty payments impose a
marginal cost on the licensee and thus affect the licensee's profit-maximizing
output choice, while under a FPULS license the marginal royalty cost is zero.
235. If there are positive recurring "fixed" costs, in a free entry/exit

equilibrium, economic theory implies that price will be driven down to average
total cost.
We ignore this complication in the text, as it does not
fundamentally alter the analysis.
If entry/exit is otherwise difficult, so that the market is oligopolistic, the

basic insight of the text is unchanged, but the mathematical derivation is
more complex.
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There are three cases, which we consider in turn:
(1) the royalties demanded may equal the cost savings
(RP = S);
(2) the royalties demanded may be less than the cost
savings (R, < S); or
(3) the royalties demanded may exceed the cost savings
(Rp > S).
In the first case, with S = Cu - Cp and R, = S, the market
clearing price if the patented alternative is adopted, (CP+ R'),
will just equal the market-clearing price C u if the unpatented
alternative is adopted, and so the market-clearing quantities in
the two cases will be the same. Consumers will be indifferent
between the two alternatives.
Manufacturing firms will
likewise be indifferent between the two alternatives; in either
case, their total cost per unit is C, = Cp + S = Cp + R.
From a societal perspective, however, the patented
alternative is clearly superior to the unpatented alternative. If
the unpatented alternative is adopted, society consumes more
real resources (costing C,) to make the product. If the patented
alternative is adopted, the cost of production is only Cp, with a
per-unit real-resource savings of S. This cost savings all
accrues to the patent holder in the form of a royalty payment
Rp. In other words, consumers and manufacturing firms are
indifferent between the two alternatives, but the patent holder
is strictly better off, and thus, society is strictly better off, if the
patented alternative is adopted.
Turning to the second case, where the royalties demanded
are less than the cost savings (Rp < S), if the patented
alternative is adopted as the standard, competition among
manufacturing firms drives prices down to (Cp+ Rp) which is
less than C. Quantity Q, = D(Cp+ R,) will be greater under the
patented alternative than under the unpatented alternative
QU = D(C').
Consumers benefit from adopting the patented alternative
as a standard both because they pay lower prices [(Cp+ Rp) is
less than Cu] and because, at the lower prices, more consumers
are willing and able to purchase the good (Qp > Q,), thereby
receiving additional consumer surplus. Manufacturing firms
are indifferent, as they still earn zero profits in equilibrium.
And society is better off because it avoids the higher real
resource costs associated with using the unpatented
alternative. In essence, some of those cost savings accrue to
the patent holder in the form of royalties, and some of them

1992

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1913

accrue to consumers in the form of lower prices.
This leaves only the third case, in which the royalties
demanded exceed the cost savings (R, > S). This case is
illustrated in Figure 1. Let us compare what would happen if
the SSO adopted the patented alternative with what would
happen if the SSO adopted the unpatented alternative.

Demand D(P)

Qp

Qu

Quantity

Figure 1
Because the market-clearing price (of C,+ Rp) is higher
with the patented standard than with the non-patented
alternative (at C,), the quantity demanded is lower if the
patented standard is adopted [at Q, = D(Cp+ R,)] than if the
non-patented standard is adopted [at Q, = D(C)]. This in turn
implies that there is what economists term a "dead weight loss"
associated with adopting the patented standard, in the form of
the shaded triangle shown in Figure 1. This represents the lost
consumer surplus from consumers who would have purchased
at a price above CU but below (Cp+ R,) but who choose not to
purchase given that the price is (Cp+ Rp).
Set against this dead weight loss, however, is the fact that,
if the unpatented standard is adopted, society uses more real
resources to produce the goods that are produced.
The
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manufacturing firms incur the real resource cost C, rather
than the lower real resource cost C. on each of the Q, = D(Cu)
units produced. This is shown by the shaded rectangle in
Figure 1. In essence, when the SSO adopts the unpatented
standard, society foregoes the savings S = C, - C, on each unit
produced.
Note that, from a private standpoint, the SSO-member
manufacturing firms would rather incur the higher cost C,
(and forego the cost savings S) rather than incur the lower costs
C, associated with the patented standard, because by doing so
they can avoid paying royalties R, which are larger than the
savings S. That is, from a bargaining theory standpoint, if the
patent holder announces its royalty terms R, ex ante (i.e., prior
to the adoption of the standard), the SSO-member
manufacturing firms will choose to adopt the unpatented
alternative as the standard because, from a private-cost
standpoint, they strictly prefer the unpatented alternative
(with its cost of C,) to the patented alternative (with its higher
private cost of C,+ R,).
But from a societal perspective, the net result is that the
reduction in dead weight loss (the shaded triangle) can be
outweighed by the extra real resources (the shaded rectangle).
It is an empirical question which of these two offsetting factors
is larger, and, thus, it is an empirical question whether society
as a whole is better off adopting the patented alternative as the
standard. But the key point here is that, in making that
determination, the amount of the royalty payments is almost
entirely irrelevant. From a societal standpoint, the royalty
payments are a "wash."236
The above discussion of case (1) assumed that the patent
holder was able to charge a royalty R. that exceeded the cost
savings S. In practice, however, faced with such a royalty
demand, the SSO members would likely tell the patent holder
that they would choose the non-patented standard instead, so
that the patent holder would receive no royalties. Faced with a
choice between maintaining its high royalty demand (and
receiving no royalties) or dropping its royalty demand to a
236. This needs to be interpreted with some care, because of the
phenomenon known as "rent-seeking." See supra note 77. Firms can and do
expend real resources in an effort to appropriate larger fractions of the overall
economic "rents" (surplus) for themselves. The real resources consumed in
such rent-seeking behavior themselves are a social cost that must be
considered.
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lower level (so that the SSO would adopt the patented standard
and the patent holder would receive royalty revenues), and
given that a rational patent holder prefers revenues to no
revenues, one would expect that, at least when the royalty
rates are negotiated ex ante (prior to the adoption of the
standard), the patent holder would moderate its royalty
demands so that the situation fell within case (1) or case (2)
above rather than case (3).
This in turn implies that adopting the patented alternative
is a win-win-win situation. Society is better off because fewer
real resources are used in producing the product.
Manufacturers are better off (or at least no worse off) because
the cost of the royalties is no more than the cost savings from
using the patented technology. And, the patent holder is better
off because it receives income from its invention.
However, when the royalty rates are negotiated ex post
(after the adoption of the standard), things are somewhat more
complex. It is still the case that society is better off using the
(lower-cost) patented standard than the (higher-cost)
unpatented alternative. And, the patent holder is better off.
But when royalties are negotiated ex post, the patent holder
may be able to extract royalties that exceed the cost savings.
In such situations, the patent holder may be able to extract
royalties that exceed the cost savings. Hence, manufacturers
will be worse off having adopted the patented technology than
using the unpatented (but higher cost) alternative.
Analytically, much the same economic issues arise in the
more realistic case where the standard in question involves
some feature of the product, and the issue is whether to adopt a
patented version of the feature or a non-equivalent but
unpatented version as a standard. The advantage of the
current approach is that, because the features of the product
are fixed, we can assume that the demand curve for the product
is the same regardless of which standard is adopted.
In the more realistic case, it is necessary to control for the
fact that consumers will have different willingness-to-pay for
products with different features. It can be shown analytically
that, when consumers uniformly value the patented product
more than the unpatented alternative, and the extent of that
preference is the same across all consumers, the same analysis
developed above for cost-saving innovations applies to such
quality-enhancing innovations, and the same conclusions apply.

